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Chapter 1: The Anticipatory Effects of Medicare Part D on Drug Uti-
lization
This paper quantifies the anticipatory effects of the passage of Medicare Part
D on prescription drug utilization. Part D expanded Medicare to include insurance
coverage for prescription drugs for the first time. While the program was imple-
mented in 2006, it had been signed into law two years earlier in December 2003 as
part of the widely publicized Medicare Modernization Act. The advance announce-
ment of this permanent future price reduction may have induced forward-looking
individuals to change their drug spending before Part D took effect. In a life-cycle
demand framework, this pre-reform utilization response is theoretically ambiguous
due to opposing income and intertemporal substitution effects. In this paper, I es-
timate the causal utilization response to the announcement of Part D in 2003 using
data from the MCBS and MEPS. This contrasts with previous evaluations of Part
D, and of drug co-insurance changes more broadly, which have estimated only con-
temporaneous utilization effects, thus implicitly assuming a myopic policy response.
My main empirical strategy exploits the predicted differential responses of chronic
and acute drugs to anticipated future prices. Given that acute drugs treat illnesses
that are largely unpredictable and short in duration, their demand is more likely to
respond to only current prices, whereas chronic drug use may respond negatively or
positively to anticipated future price reductions. I find evidence of an overall decline
in drug use for Medicare beneficiaries between 2003 and 2005. As predicted, this
pre-reform decline is differentially driven by reductions in chronic drug use, while
acute drugs are responsive to only price changes at the time of program implemen-
tation. The effect is also concentrated among the youngest Medicare beneficiaries,
for whom the health costs of delaying treatment are lowest, and for those with
below-median incomes. After accounting for this negative anticipatory response, I
find a total treatment effect on utilization in the first year of the program that is
substantially smaller than if anticipation effects are ignored.
Chapter 2: Perverse Reverse Price Competition: Average Wholesale
Prices and Medicaid Pharmaceutical Spending (with Mark Duggan and
Judith Hellerstein
Generic drugs comprise an increasing share of total prescriptions dispensed in
the U.S., rising from nearly 50 percent in 1999 to 75 percent in 2009. The generic
drug market has typically been viewed as a mostly competitive market with price
approaching marginal costs. However, the large presence of third party payers as
final purchasers may distort prices and market shares relative to what a standard
model of price competition would predict. In this paper, we investigate how generic
drug producers compete in the presence of the procurement rules of the Medicaid
program. Medicaid reimbursement to pharmacies, like that of other payers, is based
on a benchmark price called the average wholesale price (AWP), which is published
in several pricing catalogues. This list price is reported by generic producers them-
selves, and until recently has been subject to essentially no independent verification.
As a result, generic producers have had an incentive to compete for pharmacy mar-
ket share by reporting AWPs that are much greater than actual average prices, as
this spread leads to larger pharmacy profits. In 2000, after a federal government
audit of actual wholesale prices of generic products, states were advised to reduce
Medicaid reimbursement by as much as 95% for about 400 generic and off-patent
injectable, infusion, and inhalation drug products. We use variation induced by the
timing of this policy along with its differential impact on drug products to identify
the impact of this exogenous price change on the market share of affected prod-
ucts. Our findings indicate that pharmacies respond to the perverse incentives of
the Medicaid program by stocking products with the highest AWPs.
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One of the most dramatic changes in health care over the last 50 years has been
the almost exponential rise in prescription drug spending and utilization (Figure
1.1). Nearly 75% of the growth in spending since 1960 has occurred in the last 15
years. For most of the last three decades, drug spending has also grown faster than
all other medical expenditures with an average annual growth rate of 7% compared
to 4% for medical care (Figure 1.2). Prescription drugs are inherently different
from other types of medical care. The unique features of this market– such as
rapid innovation, stringent patent protection, and widespread patient and physician
directed advertising– may help to explain part of the dramatic rise in spending over
the last half century.
During this same time span, the government’s role in paying for prescription
drugs has expanded substantially beginning with the introduction of Medicaid in
1965. The introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006 increased the government’s
role even further. In 2009, these two programs paid for nearly one-third of the
$250 billion of total prescription drug expenditures in the U.S (Figure 1.3). The
government’s share of prescription drug spending will continue to rise when the
Affordable Care Act expands Medicaid coverage in 2014 and closes the “donut hole”
gap in Part D coverage by 2020.
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Understanding the impacts of this significant rise in public sector spending on
prescription drugs is important for policy decision-making. This dissertation con-
tributes to the body of literature examining the consequences of publicly provided
drug insurance on drug utilization and drug prices. In the first chapter, I quantify
the anticipatory effects of the passage of Medicare Part D on prescription drug uti-
lization. Part D was implemented two years after it was signed into law as part of
the widely publicized Medicare Modernization Act in 2003. I examine how the ad-
vance announcement of this program may have induced forward-looking individuals
to change their drug spending before Part D took effect. Estimating this effect is of
interest because it has important consequences for estimating the overall program
impact. In the second chapter, I present the results from research with Mark Dug-
gan and Judith Hellerstein investigating how generic drug producers compete in the
presence of the procurement rules of the Medicaid program. Distortions to generic
drug prices have important consequences for Medicaid spending growth.
The first chapter estimates the causal utilization response to the announce-
ment of Part D in 2003. Given the two-year lag in implementation, anticipation
of the permanent future price change brought about by subsidized coverage may
have induced individuals to change their drug consumption patterns in advance of
the program’s implementation. In a life-cycle demand framework, this pre-reform
utilization response is theoretically ambiguous due to opposing income and intertem-
poral substitution effects. On the one hand, individuals might delay initiating ther-
apies for which they are newly eligible or reduce the use of ongoing medications
until after the program is implemented, when the price is lower. This intertemporal
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substitution effect would lead to a pre-program decline in utilization. On the other
hand, since Part D lowered the cost of drugs in all future periods– reducing the life-
time cost of long-term therapies and increasing lifetime income – individuals might
begin drug therapies that they would not have otherwise started or initiate them
earlier, leading to a pre-program increase in utilization.
Estimating the announcement effect of Part D is of interest for two main rea-
sons. First, the idea that policy announcements can have quantitatively important
effects (separate from their implementation effect) on outcomes has been relatively
unexplored in the program evaluation literature. Many public policies– such as
changes to the minimum wage, taxes, welfare benefits, and so forth– are imple-
mented with a lag from their enactment date. Importantly, the health care reform
legislation that was signed into law in March 2010 will not have its major provisions
implemented until 2014 – thus, providing ample time for anticipatory responses
along many dimensions such as decisions about the purchase of health insurance,
the timing of medical care, and labor supply; and supply-side decisions about pric-
ing, employer insurance offerings, and innovation. While economists acknowledge
the potential bias from anticipation, there are few studies that explicitly estimate
anticipation effects. More specifically, anticipation effects have not been accounted
for in previous studies of the utilization effect of Part D– which may lead to biased
estimates of the program impact.
The second reason that the announcement effect is of interest is that it pro-
vides the first test of forward-looking behavior in the context of drug demand.
Finding evidence of an anticipatory response to Part D would demonstrate that
3
individuals make drug consumption decisions in a life-cycle framework. In models
of intertemporal labor supply and dynamic commodity demand more generally, op-
timizing individuals trade-off present and future consumption (or leisure) based on
their knowledge of the lifetime path of prices. However, it is not known whether
individuals are responsive to expectations of future prices when determining current
drug consumption levels. Exploiting the widely publicized announcement of Part
D as a forecastable permanent reduction in the future out-of-pocket price of drugs
provides a strong test.
In my main empirical approach, I test for an anticipatory response by exploit-
ing the predicted differential responses of chronic and acute drugs to anticipated
future prices. This strategy makes use of the observation that acute drugs treat
illnesses that are largely unpredictable and short in duration, thus their demand is
more likely to respond to only current prices, whereas chronic drugs– which treat
long duration illnesses– may respond negatively or positively to anticipated future
price reductions.
The results of this chapter demonstrate a marked decline in drug use following
the announcement of Part D, in addition to reversion towards long-run utilization
trends after the program was implemented. These results are consistent with a
dominating intertemporal substitution effect– that is, individuals deferring drug use
to the time period with subsidized coverage. Moreover, the anticipatory effects are
largest for the youngest elderly, for whom the costs of delaying treatment are lowest,
and for those with the lowest income. In the difference-in-difference results, I find a
nearly 7 percent statistically significant decline in chronic drug use relative to acute
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drug use after the announcement. This is supportive of the prediction that chronic
drugs are more responsive to future prices than acute drugs. After accounting for
this anticipatory response, the implementation effect shrinks by about one-half,
suggesting a potentially large upward bias in previous studies that evaluate the first
or second year impacts of the program.
Finally, I evaluate two alternative supply-side explanations for the observed
negative utilization response. Pharmaceutical firms may have begun to increase
prices after the announcement in anticipation of Part D, thus generating a contem-
poraneous negative demand effect. However, I do not find empirical support for
this explanation, given that price growth changes after 2003 were negative and sta-
tistically insignificant for drugs differentially used by Medicare beneficiaries. I also
consider the possibility that insurers discontinued drug coverage or reduced benefit
generosity before the implementation of Part D, thus increasing out-of-pocket costs.
While I find that there was a small decline in certain types of drug insurance cov-
erage, this change is not large enough to explain the reduction in drug utilization.
Moreover, neither of these supply-side responses can explain the differential effect
for chronic and acute drugs. The results of this chapter demonstrate that drug
utilization responds to predictable changes in future drug prices in an economically
meaningful way. I find strong evidence of a negative anticipatory response to Part
D and show that the total treatment effect on utilization in the first year of the
program is substantially smaller than if anticipation effects are ignored.
In the second chapter, Mark Duggan, Judith Hellerstein, and I study the
impact of Medicaid procurement on generic price competition. In particular, we hy-
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pothesize that procurement rules may distort generic drug prices away from marginal
cost by perversely rewarding higher-priced generics with greater market share. Med-
icaid reimbursement for each prescription is based on a benchmark price called the
average wholesale price (AWP). For each product, this list price is reported to the
catalogues by generic manufacturers themselves, and until recently has been subject
to essentially no independent verification of its resemblance to the actual average
price that pharmacies pay manufacturers to acquire drugs. As a result, generic man-
ufacturers have had an incentive to compete for pharmacy market share by reporting
AWPs that are much greater than actual average prices, as higher “spreads” lead to
larger pharmacy profits. Put another way, since higher AWPs generate higher re-
imbursement for pharmacies, manufacturers might report higher and higher AWPs
in order to induce pharmacies to stock their drug rather than a competitor’s drug.
Thus, competition among manufacturers may increase rather than reduce the prices
on which Medicaid reimbursement is based, leading to inflated Medicaid spending.
To empirically investigate the impact of Medicaid procurement on price com-
petition, we examine an intervention that caused a sharp decline in price for a
well-defined set of generic drugs. In the late 1990s, an investigation by the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) and the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control
Units (NAMFCU) “revealed a pattern of misrepresentations by some drug manu-
facturers of the average wholesale prices and wholesale acquisition costs of certain
of their products.”1 As a result of this audit, in May 2000, states were advised
to reduce the AWP used to reimburse pharmacies by as much as 95% for approxi-
1Office of the Attorney General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, State of New York, 2000.
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mately 400 generic and off-patent injectable, infusion, and inhalation drug products.
This intervention provides a useful setting for our study because it differentially tar-
geted drugs within classes of bioequivalent products, allowing for a comparison of
drug purchases before and after the intervention for DOJ targeted drugs and their
competitors.
Using more than a decade of Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data from the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), we demonstrate that actual
reimbursement per prescription purchased declined substantially for targeted drugs
following the 2000 DOJ recommendations, relative to competitor products whose
AWPs were not targeted by the DOJ. Also after the intervention, we find evidence
of a decline in the number of targeted drug prescriptions dispensed by pharmacies
and an increase in the number of competitor drugs dispensed. Overall, the market
share for targeted drugs fell by about 45% through 2004 relative to the baseline
year. While the findings in this paper are preliminary, they suggest that phar-
macies substituted away from drug products whose prices were reduced. This is
inconsistent with a standard model of price competition in which lower-priced drugs
capture higher market share. Thus, these findings provide preliminary evidence that
Medicaid procurement incentives could lead generic manufacturers to compete by
overstating AWPs and thus reducing the cost savings from these drugs.
7
Figure 1.1: Prescription Drug Expenditures in the U.S., 1960-2009
Figure 1.2: Annual Percentage Growth in Expenditures for Drugs and Other Medical
Care, 1960-2009
Notes: Source is National Health Expenditure Accounts, adjusted for inflation using the
CPI-U.
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Figure 1.3: Public Share of Drug Expenditures, 1960-2009
Notes: Source is National Health Expenditure Accounts.
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Chapter 2
The Anticipatory Effects of Medicare Part D on Drug Utilization
2.1 Introduction
In December 2003, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Mod-
ernization Act (MMA) was signed into law, expanding the Medicare program to
include insurance coverage for prescription drugs. At a cost of $32 billion in the
first year, this program, known as Part D, substantially reduced the out-of-pocket
price of drugs for beneficiaries. Part D was not implemented until January 1, 2006.
Given the two-year lag in implementation, anticipation of the permanent future price
change brought about by subsidized coverage may have induced forward-looking in-
dividuals to change their drug consumption patterns before Part D took effect. In
a life-cycle demand framework, this pre-reform utilization response is theoretically
ambiguous due to opposing income and intertemporal substitution effects. This pa-
per seeks to estimate the causal utilization response to the announcement of Part
D in 2003 using detailed drug utilization data from the Medicare Current Bene-
ficiary Survey (MCBS) and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). This
contrasts with previous evaluations of Part D, and of drug co-insurance changes
more broadly, which have estimated only contemporaneous utilization effects, thus
implicitly assuming a myopic policy response.
Estimating the announcement effect of Part D is of interest for two main rea-
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sons. First, the idea that policy announcements can have quantitatively important
effects (separate from their implementation effect) on outcomes has been relatively
unexplored in the program evaluation literature. Many public policies– such as
changes to the minimum wage, taxes, welfare benefits, and so forth– are imple-
mented with a lag from their enactment date. This lag can extend from months
to years. For example, the health care reform legislation that was signed into law
in March 2010 will not have its major provisions implemented until 2014 – thus,
providing ample time for anticipatory responses along many dimensions such as de-
cisions about the take-up of health insurance, the timing of medical care, and labor
supply; and supply-side decisions about pricing, 1 employer insurance offerings, and
innovation.
There are numerous examples in which anticipatory behavior may affect the
evaluation and interpretation of program treatment effects. An extreme example
of “implementation lag” are the Social Security Ammendments of 1983 which in-
creased the full retirement age for cohorts retiring two decades later. In this case,
the effects of the policy on retirement behavior were likely attenuated by decades of
anticipatory consumption-smoothing (Mastrobuoni, 2009). In another example of
the quantitative importance of anticipatory behavior, a small literature has arisen
examining “timing” responses versus “real” responses to the Tax Reform Act of
1986, which was phased in over two years (e.g. Slemrod, 1995; Scholes, Wilson, and
Wolfson, 1992). The advance announcement of the reform enabled firms and indi-
1Perhaps partly out of concern of anticipatory price hikes, insurers are required to report their
medical loss ratios beginning in 2010 and provide rebates for ratios below specified limits after
January 1, 2011.
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viduals to postpone income to periods when the income tax rate had been lowered
or accelerate investments and capital gains before the capital gains tax increase took
effect. These timing responses present a challenge to quantifying the real “income
creation” response or revenue consequences of the tax policy. In order to estimate
this effect, as noted in Slemrod (1995), capital gains realizations shifted to the pre-
policy period must not be counted as revenue losses and income postponed to the
post-policy period must not be counted as gains. Similarly, in estimating the real
utilization impact of Part D, drug use that is simply deferred to periods when the
costs are subsidized should not contribute to measurements of the total effect of the
program. Furthermore, any anticipatory increases in drug use due to, for example,
the income effects of the program should not be excluded from the treatment ef-
fect. In another recent paper, Blundell, Francesconi, and van der Klaauw (2010)
also examine the consequences of anticipatory responses to policy announcements,
in the case of welfare reform in the UK. Their model allows for outcomes to be a
function of beliefs about the likelihood of future policy changes in addition to the
actual benefits derived from policy implementation. Policy announcements change
the information set available to agents in forming their beliefs about future policy
changes. Thus, valid inference of the total program effect requires acknowledging
changing information sets and thus selecting identification strategies that take into
account anticipatory responses.
The second reason that the announcement effect of Part D is of interest is that
it provides the first test of forward-looking behavior in the context of drug demand.
Finding evidence of an anticipatory response to Part D would demonstrate that
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individuals make drug consumption decisions in a life-cycle framework. In models
of intertemporal labor supply and dynamic commodity demand more generally, op-
timizing individuals trade-off present and future consumption (or leisure) based on
their knowledge of the lifetime path of prices.2 However, it is not known whether
individuals are responsive to expectations of future prices when determining current
drug consumption levels. Exploiting the widely publicized announcement of Part
D as a forecastable permanent reduction in the future out-of-pocket price of drugs
provides a strong test.3
I hypothesize that drug utilization can respond negatively or positively to the
announcement of Part D. On the one hand, individuals might delay initiating ther-
apies for which they are newly eligible or reduce the use of ongoing medications
until after the program is implemented, when the price is lower. This intertemporal
substitution effect would lead to a pre-program decline in utilization. On the other
hand, since Part D lowered the cost of drugs in all future periods– reducing the life-
time cost of long-term therapies and increasing lifetime income – individuals might
begin drug therapies that they would not have otherwise started or initiate them
earlier, leading to a pre-program increase in utilization. This positive effect would
be magnified for drugs that exhibit strong complementarities in marginal health
benefits across time periods (Becker and Murphy, 1988). Nevertheless, given the
2See for example MaCurdy (1981), Altonji (1986), Hotz et al. (1988), Ham and Reilly (2002)
for models of life-cycle labor supply and empirical estimates of intertemporal wage elasticities.
Friedman (1957), Hall (1978), and others highlight the role of expectations about future income
in explaining current consumption behavior.
3The lag between the announcement and implementation of policies has also been used in tests
of the “rational addiction” model (Gruber and Koszegi, 2001) and the life-cycle hypothesis for
commodity demand (Wilcox, 1989). These papers exploit the advance announcement of state
cigarette tax changes and changes to social security benefits, respectively.
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health costs associated with delaying treatments and the fact that liquidity con-
straints may prevent individuals from consuming out of increases in future income,
it remains to be seen whether these effects exist empirically. Still, a large empirical
literature has demonstrated that individuals forgo drugs and medical care following
price increases (Goldman, Joyce, Zheng, 2007). It seems that a less extreme finding
would show that changes in the relative prices across periods alter the timing of
drug treatment rather than cause individuals to forgo treatment altogether.
In my main empirical approach, I propose a test for an anticipatory response
that exploits the predicted differential responses of chronic and acute drugs to an-
ticipated future prices. This strategy makes use of the observation that acute drugs
treat illnesses that are largely unpredictable and short in duration, thus their de-
mand is more likely to respond to only current prices, whereas chronic drugs– which
treat long duration illnesses– may respond negatively or positively to anticipated
future price reductions. This test is similar in spirit to Sorensen (2000) who also
exploits variation in drug characteristics– in his case, the frequency of purchases– to
estimate the impact of search costs on pharmacy price dispersion. In another test,
I use a similar difference-in-difference strategy to compare changes in utilization for
the elderly who are currently eligible for Medicare relative to the near-elderly who
are not yet eligible, with the caveat that the near-elderly may also be responsive to
the expectation of future price changes that are available upon becoming eligible for
Medicare. I test for this directly by comparing the anticipatory responses of near-
elderly who are very close to becoming eligible for Medicare with near-elderly who
are further away from the eligibility threshold. The age-eligible and age-ineligible
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comparison has been employed in most of the previous studies of Part D. However,
the three previous studies that have used this strategy estimate only the contem-
poraneous response to the policy, thus potentially overstating or understating the
total effect of Part D depending on the sign of the anticipatory effect.
The results of this study indicate a substantial negative announcement effect
in the aggregate, in addition to reversion towards long-run utilization trends after
the program was implemented. These results are consistent with a dominating
intertemporal substitution effect– that is, individuals deferring drug use to the time
period with subsidized coverage. Moreover, the anticipatory effects are largest for
the youngest elderly, for whom the costs of delaying treatment are lowest, and
for those with the lowest income. In the difference-in-difference results, I find a
nearly 7 percent statistically significant decline in chronic drug use relative to acute
drug use after the announcement. This is supportive of the prediction that chronic
drugs are more responsive to future prices than acute drugs. After accounting for
this anticipatory response, the implementation effect shrinks by about one-half,
suggesting a potentially large upward bias in previous studies that evaluate the first
or second year impacts of the program. This finding is robust to several different
specifications and sensitivity tests. The results for the age group comparisons also
show a decline in utilization for the elderly relative to those aged 50-58. I also
find evidence that adults who are nearing Medicare eligibility (aged 59-64) have a
negative anticipatory response to the announcement of Part D relative to younger
adults.
Finally, I evaluate two alternative supply-side explanations for the observed
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negative utilization response. Pharmaceutical firms may have begun to increase
prices after the announcement in anticipation of Part D, thus generating a contem-
poraneous negative demand effect. However, I do not find empirical support for
this explanation, given that price growth changes after 2003 were negative and sta-
tistically insignificant for drugs differentially used by Medicare beneficiaries. I also
consider the possibility that insurers discontinued drug coverage or reduced benefit
generosity before the implementation of Part D, thus increasing out-of-pocket costs.
While I find that there was a small decline in certain types of drug insurance cov-
erage, this change is not large enough to explain the reduction in drug utilization.
Moreover, neither of these supply-side responses can explain the differential effect
for chronic and acute drugs. The results of this paper demonstrate that drug uti-
lization responds to predictable changes in future drug prices in an economically
meaningful way. I find strong evidence of a negative anticipatory response to Part
D and show that the total treatment effect on utilization in the first year of the
program is substantially smaller than if anticipation effects are ignored.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides detailed
background about Medicare Part D and the related literature. Section 2.3 describes
the conceptual framework for estimating and evaluating anticipatory effects. Details
about the data and descriptive statistics are included in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5




2.2.1 Program Coverage and Participation
Medicare is an over $500 billion federal program that provides health insurance
to the elderly, aged 65 and over, and qualifying non-elderly disabled individuals.4
The traditional program consists of two fee-for-service components, Part A and Part
B, which together cover most medical services including hospital stays, doctors’
visits, nursing facilities, and home health care. Part B also covers drugs that are
physician-administered such as cancer and immunosuppressive drugs. A notable
excluded benefit from Parts A and B is outpatient prescription drugs.5 Despite
having become an increasingly large component of health care spending for the
elderly, outpatient prescription drugs were not covered by traditional Medicare until
the introduction of Part D in 2006. After the implementation of Part D, Medicare’s
share of total national spending on prescription drugs increased from 2% in 2005 to
22% in 2006 (KFF, 2007). The cost of the program was projected to be $780 billion
over the first 10 years.
Enrollment in Part D is voluntary. However, in effort to mitigate adverse se-
4The disabled comprise 16% of enrollment (SSA Annual Statistical Supplement, 2008). Indi-
viduals with end-stage renal disease are also covered under Medicare. They make up less than 1
percent of enrollees.
5Some outpatient prescription drug coverage has been provided through Part C, also known
as Medicare Advantage (MA). Part C is an alternative to Parts A and B in which beneficiaries
receive Medicare benefits through a private managed care plan. Part C plans are required to
provide a minimum level of services, but may also augment their coverage with extra benefits such
as prescription drugs. Only about 24 percent of Medicare eligibles choose to enroll in Part C over
the traditional plan (CMS, 2009). During the study period, average MA penetration was about
12% from 2003 to 2005 and 16% in 2006 (Brown et al., 2010). In 2003, 69 percent of Part C
enrollees in basic plans received drug coverage with 60 percent of plans covering only generic drugs
(Achman and Gold, 2003).
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lection, the program encourages take-up by raising the base premium incrementally
for each month that enrollment is delayed beyond initial eligibility.6 This penalty
is waived if beneficiaries can demonstrate access to actuarially equivalent coverage
elsewhere. By January 2007, 54% of Medicare beneficiaries had enrolled in Part D
(KFF, 2007), over one-third of whom did not have any source of drug insurance
two years earlier (Levy and Weir, 2009). Individuals who were dually eligible for
Medicaid and Medicare were automatically enrolled in Part D and most Medicare
Advantage (Part C) plans began to offer Part D benefits, thus immediately cov-
ering those who stayed enrolled in their plans (L&W, 2009).7 Enrollment in Part
D was also high among those who were previously covered by a private Medigap
prescription drug plan.8 Medicare beneficiaries who had received drug benefits from
employer-sponsored insurance were least likely to take-up Part D, with only 19
percent enrolling in 2006 (Levy and Weir, 2009). This low participation rate can
likely be attributed to the government’s efforts to prevent crowd-out of private in-
surance by subsidizing employers who continued to provide coverage equivalent to
Part D.9 Levy and Weir (2009) estimate that the fraction of the elderly who were
drug-uninsured declined from 24% to 7% in the first year of Part D.
6In a policy simulation, Lucarelli (2006) predicts that the 1% premium increase per month of
delayed take-up has no impact on front-loading enrollment.
7Beneficiaries must give up MA medical coverage if they enroll in a stand-alone PDP.
8Medigap plans were required to discontinue prescription drug coverage after Part D was im-
plemented.
9Firms received a subsidy, known as the Retiree Drug Subsidy (RDS), equal to 28 percent of
the cost of providing insurance for expenses between $500 to $5,000 per beneficiary (KFF, 2006).
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2.2.2 How Did Part D Lower Drug Costs?
Part D is administered by stand-alone private drug plans (PDPs) and Medicare
Advantage plans (MA-PDs) that compete for Medicare enrollees within defined
regions of the U.S. In 2006, beneficiaries could choose from among at least 40 PDPs
and one or more MA-PDs in most states (KFF, 2006). The program lowered the
out-of-pocket cost of drugs for enrollees primarily through two mechanisms.10 The
first was through the coinsurance design. All plans must offer a benefit that is at
least actuarially equivalent to a standard benefit defined by Medicare. The standard
benefit, illustrated in Figure 2.1, provides a drug subsidy that is non-linear in annual
expenditures. Plans typically require a monthly premium, which was on average $32
(or $384 annually) in 2006 (KFF, 2006). The first $250 of drug expenditures are
borne fully out-of-pocket, while the next $2000 are subsidized by 75 percent. After
reaching a spending threshold of $2,250, the beneficiary enters what is known as the
“donut-hole” in which he again bears 100 percent of the costs. After $5,100 in total
drug spending, catastrophic coverage begins and a 95 percent subsidy takes effect for
all remaining expenditures for the year. Many plans differ from this standard design,
for example, by offering flat copays for different drugs in the first region rather
than 25% coinsurance (KFF, 2006). Low-income beneficiaries receive additional
subsidies, such as reduced or zero premiums and deductibles, smaller coinsurance,
and subsidized coverage in the “donut hole” region. Medicaid beneficiaries make-up
half of those eligible for the low-income subsidy (Duggan et al., 2008).
10Part D may have also indirectly lowered out-of-pocket costs for individuals who did not enroll
in Part D if employers increased plan generosity in response to the Retiree Drug Subsidy.
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During the transition from the announcement to implementation of Part D,
prescription drug discount cards were also offered as a provision of the MMA. Be-
ginning in June 2004, Medicare beneficiaries could enroll for a small fee in a plan
that offered discounts off the retail price of drugs at the point-of-sale, with esti-
mated savings of approximately 17% (Cubanski et al., 2004). Beneficiaries with
income below 135% of the federal poverty level who were not covered by Medicaid
or other drug insurance plans were eligible for an additional $600 transitional assis-
tance (TA) subsidy for drug purchases. Take-up of the drug discount program was
low. Only 5.8 million Medicare beneficiaries had enrolled in the program six months
after it was introduced, with the vast majority automatically enrolled by their MA
plans, state pharmacy assistance plans, or by CMS due to their low income status
(Thomas, 2005). Moreover, many of the automatic enrollees did not activate their
discount cards.11 The drug discount program was discontinued when Part D was
fully implemented in 2006.
In addition to lowering enrollees’ out-of-pocket payments mechanically through
the coinsurance design, PDPs and MA-PDs could also lower spending by using their
bargaining power to negotiate lower prices from manufacturers.12 Formularies are
an instrument that can facilitate this. They shift enrollees’ utilization towards par-
ticular drug products by designating different levels of cost-sharing across different
therapeutically-similar drugs (e.g. one cholesterol-lowering drug may be designated
11For example, of the nearly two million low-income beneficiaries who were automatically enrolled
by CMS in September 2004, only 100,000 had activated their card by a phone call by December
2004 (Thomas, 2005).
12Plans can also restrict participating pharmacy networks to leverage additional discounts from
pharmacies.
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by the plan as a “preferred brand” and thus require a smaller copay than other
therapeutically similar “non-preferred” brands).13 Drugs that are least costly or
have favorable therapeutic benefits are placed on “preferred” tiers of the formulary.
Drug manufacturers, in turn, compete for placement on the “preferred”, low copay
tiers – where demand for their product will likely be higher– by lowering prices or
offering discounts and rebates directly to drug plans. Duggan and Scott-Morton
(2010) show evidence that this type of strategic behavior has led to a reduction in
prices of brand name drugs by approximately 20% for enrollees who moved from
not having drug insurance to Part D.
Together, the coinsurance design and strategic behavior of plan providers have
contributed to a 20.5% decline in the share of drug spending that is paid for out-
of-pocket by the non-institutionalized 65 and over population between 2005 and
2006. This can be seen in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, which plot the age-profile of out-of-
pocket spending using MEPS data. In comparison, the out-of-pocket share decreased
by 2.2% for the near-elderly (ages 55-64) during this time period. In levels, the
introduction of Part D appears to have scaled back annual out-of-pocket spending to
approximately 2000 levels.14 Other studies have found a decline in elderly spending
of 13 to 22% (Yin et al 2008; Ketcham and Simon 2008).
13Formularies also lower utilization by assigning some drugs prior-approval requirements or step-
therapy.
14In the MEPS, mean out-of-pocket spending for the 65 and over population declined by $224
between 2005 and 2006. Median, 25th percentile, and 95th percentile out-of-pocket spending
declined by $49, $22, and $887, respectively.
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2.2.3 Previous Evaluations of the Part D Utilization Effect
Given the large decline in the out-of-pocket price of drugs, we would expect
to see an increase in the demand for prescription drugs through substitution and
income effects. High rates of drug non-compliance and sub-optimal take-up of med-
ically beneficial therapies among the elderly prior to Part D (Adams et al, 2001;
Mojtabai and Olfson, 2003), combined with moral hazard effects, suggest that this
utilization effect potentially could be large. A large body of literature has esti-
mated the insurance price elasticity of drug demand in other contexts. In a recent
meta-analysis of over 100 studies, Goldman, Joyce, Zheng (2007) report elasticities
ranging from -0.2 to -0.6.15
Several studies have evaluated the impact of the implementation of Part D on
drug utilization in the first and second years of the program. The three most widely
cited studies employ a difference-in-difference strategy comparing changes in drug
use right before and after the implementation of Part D for the elderly relative to
the near-elderly who are not yet eligible for Medicare (Lichtenberg and Sun, 2007;
Yin et al, 2008; Ketcham and Simon, 2008). Using a large sample of claims from
the Walgreens pharmacy chain or Wolters Kluwer Health (representing 1.4 billion
prescriptions), these studies have estimated an aggregate increase in utilization of 4-
15The case of Part D differs from the previous literature in several ways. First, only a handful
of studies have estimated the price elasticity of demand for the elderly (Artz et al, 2002; Thomas,
2002; Balkrishnan et al 2001; Johnson et al 1997a; Johnson et al 1997b; Coulson, et al 1995).
Second, unlike most other studies, the change in price was very large. Moreover, Part D represents
a rare event in which prices were actually lowered for beneficiaries (GJZ, 2007). Finally, the MMA
varied drug prices for Medicare beneficiaries, while holding prices for other medical goods constant.
Thus, it is possible to isolate the own-price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs from other
demand responses such as doctor visits which may indirectly influence drug use. This is a known
limitation of the RAND Health Insurance experiment (Leibowitz et al, 1985) which applied the
same coinsurance rate to drugs and non-drug medical expenditures.
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10% 16 with implied elasticities ranging from -0.2 to -0.7. A fourth recent paper uses
the MCBS to compare the previously drug-uninsured elderly with those with drug
insurance finding statistically insignificant differences in the aggregate utilization
effect across insurance types (Kaestner and Kahn, 2010). Finally, using IMS sales
data, Duggan and Scott-Morton (2010) examine whether drug use increased between
2003 and 2006 differentially for drugs that had a higher Medicare market share. They
find a large utilization effect that is insignificant and statistically imprecise.
One critical limitation of the previous difference-in-difference studies using
the elderly and near-elderly comparison is that they do not possess a long enough
time series of data to account for possible anticipation effects. In these studies,
the “pre-period” begins in September or December of 200417– nearly one year after
the announcement of Part D. If the announcement caused Medicare beneficiaries to
shift the timing of drug purchases until after implementation, leading to a transi-
tory pre-implementation decline in utilization, the DID estimator will overstate the
program effect. The near-elderly “comparison group” is not an adequate control
for anticipatory responses by the elderly “treated group” because those who are
not yet eligible for Part D would not be expected to respond to the announcement
with the same intensity as those who are already eligible. By not accounting for
anticipatory effects, the DID estimate will falsely attribute the upward reversion in
drug use following the pre-reform decline to the Part D program effect. This identi-
16These estimates are from the age-standardization that Ketcham and Simon (2008) perform to
compare the results of Yin et al. (2008) and Lichtenberg and Sun (2007).
17The pre-period data for the 3 DID studies comparing the elderly and near-elderly are as
follows: September 2004-December 2005 (Lichtenberg and Sun, 2007, Yin et al. 2008); December
2004-December 2005 (Ketcham and Simon, 2009).
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fication problem is structurally similar to the “pre-program dip” (also known as the
“Ashenfelter dip”) that has been widely discussed in the literature evaluating job
training programs (see for example Ashenfelter, 1978; Heckman and Smith, 1999).
Conversely, if the announcement caused beneficiaries to increase drug use in the
pre-implementation period, the DID estimator will understate the program effect,
since part of the real impact of Part D occurs before the program is implemented.
Thus, using only a small window of data around the implementation date generates
biased and variable treatment effect estimates if there is an anticipatory response.
2.3 Accounting for Anticipatory Responses
2.3.1 Conceptual Framework
The implicit assumption in the previous studies that compare drug utilization
right before and after the implementation of Part D is that individuals respond my-
opically to the policy change. I take a more dynamic view. Given that the lag in
program implementation allowed individuals to forecast price changes two years in
advance, individuals’ demand for prescription drugs may respond not only to current
prices, but also to expectations of future prices. Thus, estimates of the treatment
effect of Part D on drug utilization should combine the net effect of the anticipatory
response and the response at implementation.
A. Life-Cycle Demand for Prescription Drugs
The notion that future prices can affect present behavior is well-established. This
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idea is central to models of dynamic commodity demand and intertemporal labor
supply, beginning with Lucas and Rapping (1970) and Friedman’s “permanent in-
come hypothesis” (1957). The large theoretical and empirical literature that has
followed for labor supply is surveyed in Card (1991). These models emphasize the
role of the lifetime path of prices in the allocation of consumption and leisure over
the life-cycle. Similarly, the demand for healthcare and prescription drugs is part
of a life-cycle decision-making process (Grossman, 1972).18 For forward-looking in-
dividuals, current demand should be a function of everything that is known about
the lifetime path of prices– past, present and future. Then, through intertemporal
substitution, individuals allocate greater drug use to periods when drugs are cheaper
and less drug use to periods when drugs are more expensive, all else equal.
The sudden announcement of Part D in 2003 changed individuals’ expecta-
tions about the future path of prices for drugs. Since this reform represented a
permanent change, it lowered the entire stream of out-of-pocket prices in all future
periods beginning in the year of implementation. In response, the life-cycle model
predicts that individuals should have immediately used this new information to re-
optimize their consumption path as soon as the announcement was made. Moreover,
since Part D changed the lifetime price path of drugs for individuals of all ages, it
is possible that the announcement affected consumption patterns for even those not
yet eligible for Medicare. Though, the short-run effects are likely to be strongest for
Medicare beneficiaries and individuals closest to Medicare eligibility. The consump-
18Lucarelli (2006) develops a dynamic model of drug demand in the spirit of Grossman (1972)
to simulate the demand response to the implementation of Part D. However, like other Part D
studies, he does not account for possible anticipatory demand responses in the pre-implementation
period.
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tion path in the pre-reform period could have shifted downwards or upwards after
the announcement due to opposing intertemporal substitution and income effects.
This is discussed in detail in the next section.
B. Differential Responses of Chronic and Acute Drugs
The life-cycle model suggests that we should observe a change in drug utilization by
the elderly in response to the announcement of Part D. However, from an empirical
standpoint, it will be difficult to disentangle aggregate changes in drug utilization
caused by anticipatory behavior from other consumption fluctuations that may have
occurred during this time period. I propose a way of testing for an anticipatory re-
sponse (or equivalently, testing for forward-looking life-cycle behavior) that exploits
the predicted differential responses of chronic and acute drugs to anticipated future
prices. This will form the basis of my main difference-in-difference empirical strat-
egy, since I can compare changes in utilization for drugs in which the announcement
of Part D potentially had a larger or smaller effect.
For this analysis, the key difference between acute and chronic drugs is their
average duration of use. Acute drugs (e.g. antibiotics) treat illnesses that are
largely unpredictable, short in duration, and require immediate treatment; mean-
while, chronic drugs treat long-term illnesses. Put differently, it is typically the case
that acute drugs produce a health benefit in only the current period, while chronic
drugs can produce health benefits in many periods. Moreover, the persistence of
chronic drug use means that current use is a good predictor of future use. Given
these features, future prices should have a much larger effect on current use for
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chronic drugs than for acute drugs. The effect of the future price reduction could
be negative or positive.
First, there will be a negative anticipatory response to Part D if there are
dominating intertemporal substitution effects: individuals will delay the use of some
drugs until after the program is implemented, when the out-of-pocket price is lower.
Furthermore, this effect should be concentrated among chronic drugs since there
is less scope for shifting acute drug use to later time periods given the transitory
nature of their health benefits. For example, in the intervening period between
the announcement and implementation of Part D, individuals may have asked their
physicians to delay the initiation of chronic treatments for which they were newly
clinically eligible. Individuals may have also reduced their compliance with pre-
scriptions for “less-essential” medications that they believed could be suspended
temporarily without posing an immediate health risk.
It should be emphasized that in order for the intertemporal substitution effect
to generate a pre-reform decline in utilization relative to the counterfactual trend, it
must be the case that elderly who would have otherwise taken a drug or initiated a
new treatment in the absence of Part D decided to postpone treatment after learning
of the announcement. One concern is that, for drugs that are taken for an entire
lifetime, this response would not fit a standard model of rational behavior. Individ-
uals would find it optimal to purchase the drug when the expected lifetime path of
prices for that treatment was higher (in the absence of the announcement), but not
purchase the drug when the expected lifetime path of prices for that treatment was
lower (after learning of the announcement). Nevertheless, most drugs are used for
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a finite period of time, at least in expectation, because they fail to be effective with
some probability, better drugs enter the market, or their usefulness is eventually
outlived. Thus, given the uncertainty of treatment duration, it may be optimal,
depending on the health costs, to defer use or experimentation with new treatments
of unknown effectiveness to periods when the price of drugs is lower. Moreover,
even in the case of a lifetime therapy, we can appeal to behavioral models of con-
textual price effects (Thaler, 1985) to explain a delay in the timing of purchases.
If we consider the announcement of Part D as effectively introducing a new lower
“reference price” for drugs, then purchasing drugs before implementation at a price
that is higher than the reference price may be perceived as a “loss”, which generates
so-called transaction disutility. This disutility may consequently reduce drug use.
Second, there will be a positive anticipatory response to Part D if there are
dominating income effects. Part D increased lifetime income by lowering the cost
of drugs in each period. Since this income effect is distributed across the life-cycle,
it could generate increases in both drug purchases and other consumption in any
period after the announcement. Thus, individuals might begin drug therapies that
they would not have otherwise started or initiate them earlier. Importantly, the
magnitude of the income effect varies with the size of the expected benefit of Part
D. Chronic drug users should anticipate a large subsidy from Part D given the
persistence in their drug use; whereas purely acute drug users, facing uncertain fu-
ture health shocks, may anticipate a much smaller subsidy in expectation.19 Again,
19Stronger income effects can exist for acute drug use by chronic users than for acute drug use
by purely acute drug users.
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chronic drugs are predicted to be more responsive to the future price change than
acute drugs since the income effect will be larger. Also, to the extent that individu-
als take into account the entire cost of a therapy before deciding whether to initiate
a treatment, substitution between drug therapies and other consumption may lead
to an increase in chronic drug use. These positive effects would be reinforced for
drugs that exhibit strong complementarities in marginal health benefits across time
periods. The intuition for this response is analogous to the model for “rational
addiction” (Becker and Murphy, 1988). These drugs have the feature that a larger
stock of past consumption raises the marginal health benefit from current consump-
tion. Thus individuals who anticipate increasing drug use in the future (because of
an anticipated future reduction in price), should increase use in the current period
in order to increase the benefit in the next period. Models of habit formation and
durable goods (e.g. Browning 1988; Hotz et al., 1991; Pollack, 1970) that also in-
corporate non-separability of preferences over time are also relevant for explaining
patterns in chronic drug use.
To summarize, chronic drugs are predicted to be more responsive to the an-
nouncement of Part D than acute drugs and this response may be either negative or
positive. This hypothesis will be rejected empirically if elderly are myopic (i.e. they
make decisions based only on current prices, even though information about future
prices is available), the health costs of delaying drug use exceed the utility gain, or
the elderly are liquidity constrained and cannot consume out of increases in future
income.
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C. Empirical Tests of the Life-Cycle Model
Despite the large empirical literature that has tested the life-cycle model in other
contexts, I am aware of only two studies of anticipatory responses to coinsurance
price changes in the case of non-drug medical care. No studies have examined the
anticipatory demand response to Part D. Long, Marquis, and Rogers (1998) use
data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation to compare doctors
visits and inpatient admissions among individuals who have just gained or lost in-
surance relative to those who are continuously insured or uninsured. They find no
evidence of an anticipatory effect. However, their method relies on cross-sectional
variation in insurance transition types and thus does not account for the likely en-
dogeneity of health insurance initiation and discontinuation. Moreover, it cannot be
determined whether these transitions were forecastable. Gross (2009) exploits the
forecastable change in health insurance status that occurs when teenagers lose their
family’s coverage and become uninsured at age 19 to test whether individuals are
forward looking in their demand for medical care. Using Medstat data, the study
finds no evidence that teenagers “stock up” on health care before losing insurance.
However, the author notes that finding an effect is hindered by the fact that so few
teenagers in the sample use any medical care. Related to these studies, the RAND
Health Insurance experiment has also been criticized for its implicit assumption of
myopia in not accounting for within-year price variation for medical care. Kowalski
(2009) argues that elasticities from the RAND Health Insurance study may be bi-
ased downwards because individuals may actually respond to year-end price–which
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is zero if they anticipate reaching the stop-loss– rather than the current price.20 My
study overcomes many of the challenges that the previous studies have faced since
the price change resulting from Part D is exogenous, the announcement was highly
publicized, and drug use is a highly prevalent and high frequency outcome for the
elderly.
2.3.2 Salience and Timing of the Part D Announcement
My test of anticipatory behavior relies on two assumptions: first, that the
impending price reduction due to Part D was part of individuals’ information sets
at the time of the announcement; second, that the policy change was not anticipated
before the announcement. In this section, I document that the announcement was
highly salient and also that its timing was a surprise. Part D was signed into law as
part of the MMA on December 8, 2003. But the program did not actually begin until
January 1, 2006, more than 2 years later. This implementation date was stipulated
by the MMA and thus was known in advance. Given the wide media coverage of the
passage of the legislation, it is reasonable to assume that many elderly anticipated
a reduction in their future drug expenditures. Figure 2.4 plots data from a Kaiser
Family Foundation Health Poll of the trend in the fraction of elderly who followed the
Medicare prescription drug benefit “very closely” or “somewhat closely.” The poll
demonstrates high awareness of the debate among the elderly with approximately
75 percent following news of the debate. Moreover, the elderly followed the debate
20Manning et al (1987) also had noted that the stop-loss may hamper their ability to estimate
elasticities accurately.
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most closely in the month that the law was signed and least carefully in the months
after it was passed suggesting awareness that the debate had ended. Another KFF
poll which quizzed21 individuals about whether the bill had passed 2 months after
it was signed into law found that only 32 percent of elderly ages 65+ could correctly
respond that the bill had been signed into law, 41 percent were uncertain (among
the non-elderly, only 21 percent responded correctly). This is less supportive of
a strong awareness of the program announcement. However, even if the elderly
were not fully aware of the passage of the MMA, their physicians may have been
better informed. Furthermore, the size of the benefit was immediately known as
news sources (e.g. Pear, 2003) reported precisely the coinsurance schedule that was
ultimately implemented, as described in Section 2.2.
Finally, the timing of the announcement was largely unexpected. This is a
necessary feature of the policy in order to pin down the time period in which to
estimate the anticipatory effect. Adding prescription drug coverage to Medicare had
been the subject of nearly two decades of debate and failed legislative proposals (see
Oliver, et al., 2004 for a history of drug initiatives). The prescription drug legislation
was highly controversial throughout the debate and press accounts suggest that it
was far from certain that a bill would pass at any point in time. The final conference
bill that passed in the House and Senate in late November did so with very thin
margins, 220 to 215 and 54 to 44 respectively, after the longest known roll-call vote
in the history of the House (Oliver, et al., 2004). Thus anticipatory responses are
21The poll asked: “You may have heard news about recent debates in Congress on a bill that
would add a prescription drug benefit to Medicare. To the best of your knowledge, has this bill
been passed by Congress and signed into law by President Bush, or not?
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unlikely to have occurred before the final months of 2003.
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.4.1 Data Description
In this paper, I use two sources of data on drug utilization: the Medicare Cur-
rent Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) Cost and Use module for 2001-2006 and the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) Household Component and Prescribed Medicine
Files for 1997-2007. Both surveys collect nationally representative data on non-
institutionalized individuals’ healthcare utilization and expenditures. The MCBS
sample consists of only Medicare beneficiaries, while the MEPS surveys households
of all ages. Importantly, both datasets provide detailed records of each prescription
drug purchased (including refills) during the calendar year including the drug name,
therapeutic drug class, strength and dosage, and expenditures by source of payment
(e.g. Medicare, private insurance, self-pay). The MCBS will serve as the primary
data source for the analysis since the sample size for the population of interest is
more than twice as large as in the MEPS. One key advantage of the MEPS is that
it samples non-disabled individuals under age 65. Since the near-elderly serve as an
informative comparison group for the Medicare-eligible elderly, I will also use MEPS
data in some of the analyses.
From the initial MCBS sample of 74,139 observations, I exclude individuals
with incomplete drug utilization records for the calendar year since the outcome
variable of interest is the total count of prescriptions filled during the year. This
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involves dropping individuals who were not interviewed in every round, had par-
tial year Medicare eligibility, or became institutionalized (20.6% of the sample). I
also exclude individuals with missing demographic characteristics. The final MCBS
sample of Medicare beneficiaries ages 66-85 includes 41,475 observations.22 In many
specifications, I use a sample of the youngest Medicare beneficiaries ages 66-74 which
includes 20,072 observations.
One caveat is that, unlike other studies of Part D that use pharmacy claims
records, the drug utilization data used in this paper is self-reported.23 Thus a
limitation of this data is that it is subject to reporting error. I can roughly estimate
the severity of misreporting using the 2006 MCBS. In 2006, survey records were
matched to Medicare administrative data for the first time for those enrolled in
Part D. The MCBS identifies which drug records are extracted from the survey
only, the claims only, or both the survey and claims. Among all prescription claims,
18.9% of prescription records are reported only in administrative claims and thus
would have been absent from the survey data in previous years. Nevertheless, since
the emphasis of my analysis is on changes in utilization and not on levels, the
misreporting error will not confound my estimates if the magnitude of misreporting
does not vary from year to year and is orthogonal to my explanatory variables of
interest. It should be noted that in my analysis I exclude claims-only drug records
22I exclude individuals over age 85 due to the non-comparable measurement of drug utilization
for the institutionalized population. A high proportion of elderly over 85 are institutionalized (28%
relative to 8% for individuals aged 75-85 and 2% for individuals aged 66-74). For institutionalized
beneficiaries, MCBS prescription records are collected in a separate community survey which is not
directly comparable to the non-institutionalized records. Thus the sample of prescription records
is not representative for this age group.
23Both the MCBS and MEPS implement survey collection techniques to maximize the quality
of the reports, which include asking participants to save receipts and empty prescription bottles.
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in the 2006 MCBS for comparability with previous years.
Despite this limitation, there are a number of advantages to using survey data
over pharmacy claims. The survey data provides a nationally representative sample,
richer demographic and health insurance status characteristics, and importantly, a
long enough time frame to examine utilization patterns from before the announce-
ment of Part D. Also, as noted in Ketcham and Simon (2008), Part D may have
changed the extent to which people use multiple pharmacies or it may have induced
people to use different pharmacies than their usual store. Thus, using data from a
single pharmacy may make it difficult to produce accurate estimates of utilization
changes along the extensive margin. This may be better captured in nationally
representative survey data.
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
In table 2.1, descriptive statistics are reported for various sub-groups from the
MCBS and MEPS. Column 4 presents characteristics of the elderly ages 66-74 from
the MCBS, which is the sample used in most of the analyses. Prescription drug use
is highly prevalent among this group. 92 percent of the elderly purchase at least one
prescription each year– filling on average 28 prescriptions at a total cost of $1,789. In
addition to receiving Medicare coverage, 11 percent of the sample are dually enrolled
in Medicaid and 67 percent are covered by supplementary private insurance plans
such as Medigap or retiree employer benefits. I estimate that 16 percent of elderly
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did not have any drug insurance coverage prior to 2006.24 This is a slightly lower
estimate than other sources. For example, Levy and Weir (2009) find that 24%
are drug-uninsured in the Health and Retirement Survey in 2004. Comparing the
MCBS to the MEPS for the same age group (Columns 3 and 4) demonstrates that
mean utilization and expenditures are slightly higher in the MCBS. This may be
partially explained by differences in demographic characteristics across the samples
which are correlated with drug use and insurance coverage. The MCBS sample is
slightly older and more educated.
Drug utilization is lower for the comparison group of adults ages 50-58 (Col-
umn 1). Still, this group also has a high rate of prescription drug use (76 percent)
and purchase nearly two-thirds as many prescriptions as the elderly. Total annual
expenditures are 38% less and the proportion paid out-of-pocket is also lower. Natu-
rally, the largest differences in demographic characteristics across the two age groups
are in employment status and insurance coverage.
In columns 5 and 6, means are reported for individuals who filled at least one
acute prescription (comparison group) or at least one chronic prescription (treatment
group). Many individuals purchased both types of drugs and are included in both
samples. The elderly are more likely to use a chronic drug than an acute drug (86%
fill a chronic prescription versus 55% for acute) and fill on average 22 prescriptions of
chronic drugs and 3 prescriptions of acute drugs per year. The total cost of a chronic
24The MCBS elicits detailed information for up to five insurance plans (private, private HMO, or
Medicare HMO), including whether the plan covers drugs or offers a drug discount card. A person
is defined as drug-insured if they report that at least one of their plans covers prescription drugs.
If the individual only has access to a drug discount card they are not considered drug-insured.
Individuals who receive drug coverage from a public program other than Medicaid or Medicare
(such as the VA or a state-sponsored drug plan) are also defined as drug-insured.
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drug prescription is 45% higher than an acute drug and the out-of-pocket share is
lower. This may reflect the fact that the higher spending that results from chronic
drug purchases pushes individuals past deductibles and into lower levels of cost-
sharing. There are no significant differences in means of demographic characteristics
across the two (overlapping) samples.
2.5 Empirical Framework
2.5.1 Baseline Model
I estimate the announcement effect of Part D on drug utilization by using a
difference-in-difference estimator with group-specific linear trends. The basic strat-
egy compares deviations from drug utilization trends for a treatment group that is
more affected by the announcement of Part D with the deviation from trend for a
comparison group that is less affected. As motivated by the conceptual framework,
my main comparison is between chronic and acute drugs. Although, I also compare
individuals who are age-eligible for Medicare with those who are age-ineligible. The
key identifying assumption is that in the absence of the announcement, any uti-
lization differences between treatment and comparison groups would continue along
the same trend. I include group-specific linear trends because I find that chronic
and acute drugs do not exhibit parallel utilization trends in the pre-announcement
period.
In particular, I estimate variants of the following equation which includes the
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announcement and implementation as separate policies:
Yitg = θ0 + θ1t+ θ2ANNOUNCEt + θ3IMPLEMENTt + θ4Tig + θ5(Tig × t)
+ θ6(Tig × ANNOUNCEt) + θ7(Tig × IMPLEMENTt) +X ′itΓ + εitg
(2.1)
For the chronic and acute drug comparison, the outcome is the number of
prescriptions (new and refill) purchased by individual i in year t in drug category
g (where g is chronic or acute). That is, each individual receives two observations
in the regression– one for the number of chronic drugs that they purchase and one
for the number of acute drugs they purchase, including zeros. Tig is an indicator
which equals one if the observation is for chronic drugs, and zero if the observation
is for acute drugs. For the age-eligible and age-ineligible comparison, I include two
treatment indicators: T1i and T2i.
25 T1i is an indicator for Medicare-eligible adults
aged 66-74 and T2i is an indicator for Medicare-ineligible adults aged 59-64 who
are close to the eligibility threshold. The omitted comparison group are adults aged
50-58 who are furthest from Medicare eligibility. In this specification, the outcome
is the total number of prescriptions filled. Thus, each individual receives only one
observation per year. I also consider the log of the number of prescriptions in some
specifications.26
ANNOUNCEt is an indicator variable which turns on in 2004 and 2005,
25The age-eligible and age-ineligible model is as follows:
Yit = β0 + β1t+ β2ANNOUNCEt + β3IMPLEMENTt + β4T1i + β5T2i + β6(T1i × t) + β7(T2i × t)
+ β8(T1i ×ANNOUNCEt) + β9(T2i ×ANNOUNCEt) + β10(T1i × IMPLEMENTt)
+ β11(T2i × IMPLEMENTt) +X ′itΓ + εit
26To account for zeros in the data, the log transformation is log(number of prescriptions +1).
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the time period between the announcement and implementation of Part D, and
IMPLEMENTt is an indicator which turns on in 2006 after the program has been
implemented. The omitted time period is 2001 to 2003. Xit is a vector of individual
level control variables including male, age, age-squared, married, three education
dummies, three race dummies, three region dummies, metro-area, employment sta-
tus, Medicaid enrollment, and Medicare HMO enrollment.27 Standard errors are
clustered at the person level to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix
across the two drug groups and over time. I allow for differential trends across
treatment and comparison groups by interacting a linear time trend t (which takes
on a value of 1 in 2001) with the treatment indicator. It should be noted that
Equation 2.1 allows only for an intercept shift in trends for the announcement and
implementation effects. While I cannot estimate a slope shift for the implementation
effect given that there is only one year of post-implementation data, I do estimate
slope shifts for the announcement effect in some specifications.
The outline of the analysis proceeds as follows. First, I use the difference-in-
difference methodology to compare adults who are not yet age-eligible for Part D
with those who are currently eligible. This is a natural starting point given that this
is the cut of the data used by most previous studies of the utilization effect of Part
D. However, even those who are not yet eligible for Medicare may anticipate future
subsidized coverage and respond to the announcement. Those who are closest to age
65 are more likely to be responsive than those who are further away from eligibility.
27I do not include a control for drug insurance coverage because it may itself be an outcome of
the announcement and implementation of Part D.
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Thus, producing a valid difference-in-difference estimate requires a comparison age
group that is far enough away from the eligibility cut-off so that they are less likely
to respond to Part D, but near enough to the cut-off so that they have similar drug
utilization patterns as the elderly. This criteria may be difficult to satisfy. For one,
younger age-groups may use chronic and acute drugs in different proportions which
may affect their responsiveness to current and future price changes. I select the
age group from 50-58 as the comparison sample. However, it is not clear that the
utilization patterns of this group are similar enough to the elderly to provide a valid
estimate of counterfactual trends.
Given the limitations of the age-ineligible comparison group, the majority of
the analysis exploits variation in the predicted impact of the announcement within
the elderly, Medicare-eligible sample. I begin by estimating Equation 2.1 for the
elderly in the aggregate by constraining the coefficients of the interaction terms
and treatment indicator to be zero. I use this specification to estimate population
program effects for the announcement and implementation of Part D. However, given
that this strategy estimates these effects as only deviations from the pre-existing
trend, the estimates will be biased if other aggregate shocks to utilization occur
during this time period. To overcome this concern, in my main test for anticipatory
effects, I exploit the differential predicted response of chronic and acute drugs to
anticipated future price changes. As discussed extensively in Section 2.3.1, chronic
drugs should be more affected by the announcement of Part D than acute drugs.
The key variable of interest is the interaction between the announcement period and
chronic drug indicator. A non-zero θ6 is evidence of a causal announcement effect.
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Chronic drugs may respond positively or negatively to the announcement.
In theory, another comparison could be made between the previously drug-
insured and drug-uninsured elderly. We should observe a greater anticipatory re-
sponse for individuals who ultimately enroll in Part D compared to those who do
not enroll. Since I can only observe a given individual for three years in the MCBS, I
cannot retrospectively follow individuals who enrolled in Part D and compare their
announcement response with those who did not enroll in Part D. Previous drug
insurance status has been shown to be a good proxy for eventual enrollment status
(Levy and Weir, 2009) and has been used in other work (Kaestner and Kahn, 2010).
However, as I will demonstrate in Section 2.7.2, there was a statistically significant
3.7 percentage point decline in drug insurance coverage following the announcement
of Part D. Given this large change in coverage, it is likely that the composition of the
treatment and comparison groups changed at time of the announcement, thereby
making insurance status itself endogenous.
2.5.2 Defining Chronic and Acute Drugs
I use an empirical approach for categorizing drugs as chronic and acute based
on observed treatment duration. This method exploits average treatment patterns
in the population as opposed to clinical recommendations which may or may not
be adopted. The classification method (which is illustrated in Appendix Figure
A.1) proceeds as follows. First, I pool MCBS drug records for the elderly ages
65 and over from 2002-2003. I use data from before the announcement so as not
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to confound underlying utilization patterns with the treatment effect of Part D.
For each individual, I count the number of purchases of each drug in each year.
I then combine these counts across people to construct empirical distributions of
the number of prescriptions filled in a year for drugs in each therapeutic class.
Each drug is assigned one of 38 possible First Data Bank drug class categories (32
classes have a positive number of prescriptions for the elderly). I exclude drugs
with no therapeutic classification. For example, person 1 in the illustration filled 1
prescription of Amoxicillin and 2 prescriptions of Cefaclor (both Antiinfectives), and
5 prescriptions of Zocor (a Cardiovascular drug) in 2002. Thus, she contributes a 1
and 2 to the Antiinfectives distribution and a 5 to the Cardiovascular distribution.
As is apparent in the figure, Antiinfectives are clearly an acute class since the vast
majority of drugs are filled only once a year. Cardiovascular drugs, on the other
hand, are more chronic in nature since they are filled many times a year to be used
for a longer duration of treatment.
In the most conservative classification, I define a drug class as acute if the
median of the empirical distribution of purchases by an individual per year is 2
or less and chronic if the median is greater than 2. I assign this classification
to all drugs within the therapeutic class for each year of the survey. 11 out of
32 classes used by the elderly are classified as acute using this method, including
Analgesics, EENT preparations, and Antiinfectives (as shown in Appendix Table
A.1). Cardiovascular drugs, Diuretics, and Hypoglycemics are among the most
frequently purchased chronic treatments. While this median rule guarantees that
the majority of drugs in the therapeutic class are either chronic or acute, there is
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clearly some measurement error since some drugs in chronic classes are actually
acute and vice versa and some drugs can be used for both indications. The extent
of the measurement error will vary across therapeutic classes depending on how
heterogeneous treatment duration is within the class. In sensitivity analyses, I
exclude drugs from the most heterogeneous classes from the sample by using more
stringent classification rules. Appendix Figure A.1 presents the classification rules in
order of increasing stringency. For example the “>75% in drug group” rule defines
the drug class as acute if more than 75% of drugs in the class are filled 2 times or
less and chronic if more than 75% of drugs in the class are filled more than 2 times.
In this sensitivity analysis, therapeutic classes for which fewer than 75% of drugs
can be classified as either acute or chronic (e.g. 45% acute, 55% chronic) are then
dropped from the sample. I also validate the results of this classification method
by comparing these empirical classifications with those made by physicians. I find
a very close correspondence between both classification methods.28
28I compare the classification results generated by the empirical algorithm with classifications
made by three family medicine physicians. I asked each physician to report whether drugs in each
class were “somewhat more likely to be acute than chronic,” “much more likely to be acute than
chronic,” “somewhat more likely to be chronic than acute,” or “much more likely to be chronic
than acute.” I provided the physicians with the drug class name and several examples of the most
commonly used drugs in each class from the MCBS (though, I asked that they think about the
class broadly when making their classifications). In the most conservative classification (using
the median classification rule), the empirical algorithm matches the physicians’ classifications of
chronic versus acute drug classes 85% of the time. The match rate improves as the classification
rule for the empirical algorithm becomes more stringent. For example, using the “>65% in drug




I begin the analysis by comparing drug utilization changes following the an-
nouncement and implementation of Part D for elderly who are eligible for Medicare
relative to the near-elderly. Medicare-eligibility status is a natural first cut for iden-
tifying the announcement effect. This strategy has been used in most previous
studies of Part D. I select adults ages 50-58 as the initial comparison group because
they are far enough away from eligibility that they are unlikely to respond to the
announcement, and Medicare beneficiaries ages 66-74 who are closest in age to the
comparison group. Figure 2.5 plots aggregate trends in drug utilization for these
two age groups in the MCBS and MEPS from 1997-2007. The two datasets pro-
vide largely comparable measures of drug utilization. For the elderly, the average
number of prescriptions filled per year had been rising since 1997. Then imme-
diately following the December 2003 Part D announcement there was a distinct
leveling off and eventual decline in drug utilization. In contrast, no trend break
after the announcement is observed for the near-elderly. After 2006, when Part D
took effect, drug use for the elderly reverted upwards towards its pre-2003 trend.
The pre-program “dip” in utilization for the elderly is consistent with a dominating
intertemporal substitution effect, in which beneficiaries delay some drug use until
after Part D is implemented. Consequently, the increase between 2005 and 2006 may
constitute both the treatment effect of Part D and mean reversion. Thus, studies
that use small windows of data around the implementation date could overstate the
implementation effect.
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While the striking graphical evidence is strongly suggestive of a negative an-
nouncement effect, we might be concerned that the 50-58 age group does not pro-
vide a sufficient measure of counterfactual drug utilization for the elderly. There are
many important differences between adults above and below age 65: most notably
in employment status, insurance coverage, and the type and quantity of drugs used.
Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that time-varying factors related to, for
example, Social Security benefits, unemployment, Medicare benefits, the markets
of certain drugs, and so forth could explain the pre-program decline in utilization
for the elderly, since these factors are also likely to have a differential impact on
the elderly and near-elderly.29 For this reason, I look for identifying variation for
the announcement effect within the elderly age group in the remainder of the pa-
per, using the MCBS. I first consider distributional impacts of the announcement
and variation in the intensity of the announcement effect by age and demographic
groups. I then conduct my main test comparing the differential effects for chronic
and acute drug utilization among the elderly. I revisit the age-ineligible comparison
group in the final section to test whether those who are nearing eligibility are also
responsive to the announcement relative to younger adults who are further from
eligibility. Taken together, these tests aim to identify whether the decline in drug
utilization observed in Figure 2.5 represents a causal response to the announcement
of Part D.
29Also, as noted before, the near-elderly does not provide a valid counterfactual for estimating
the implementation effect, since the pattern of utilization before implementation is not the same
for elderly and near-elderly individuals.
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2.6.1 Aggregate Drug Utilization Effects for the Elderly
A. Quantifying the Aggregate Effect
Before decomposing the announcement effect to identify sources of the utilization
decline, I quantify the magnitude of the aggregate effect for the elderly. I also
illustrate the possible severity of the anticipation bias by comparing estimates of the
implementation effect that either take into account or do not take into account the
pre-program decline in utilization. I estimate the announcement and implementation
effects as deviations from the prior utilization trend in a simple interrupted time
series model for the elderly sample. The specification is equivalent to setting the
coefficients of the treatment interaction terms and treatment indicator of Equation
2.1 equal to zero as follows:
Yit = π0 + π1t+ π2ANNOUNCEt + π3IMPLEMENTt +X
′
itΓ + εit (2.2)
Table 2.2 reports the the OLS results for variants of this equation.30 The
first three columns use total prescriptions as the dependent variable. In column
1, only the implementation indicator is included along with the time trend and
controls, under the assumption that π2 = 0. This specification is analogous to
previous studies that estimate the contemporaneous treatment effect of Part D,
ignoring possible anticipatory effects. In this case, the implementation effect is
large, positive, and statistically significant at the 1% level, representing an average
30Note that in this analysis, I do not report estimates of elasticities, as other studies of Part
D have done, because individuals responded to a perceived price change which is unknown. This
perceived price change is a function of the information about Part D that individuals had before
the program was implemented.
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annual increase of 3 prescriptions or a 10.6% increase relative to the sample mean.
This estimate– which is comparable to the effect size found in other studies of 4 to
10%– would suggest that Part D had a large effect on utilization in the first year of
the program.
If the assumption of no anticipatory effects is correct, controlling for the an-
nouncement indicator should not change the estimate of π3. On the contrary, I
find that after adding the announcement indicator in column 3, the implementation
effect shrinks from 3.0 to 0.9 and becomes statistically insignificant, although it is
imprecisely estimated. This provides the first piece of evidence that there may be
a large upward bias in the implementation effect if anticipatory responses are not
taken into account. The announcement effect itself (π2) is statistically significant
and negative, representing a decline of 1.61 prescriptions (a 6% decline relative to
the sample mean).31 This announcement response is also economically important
given that it is nearly equivalent to the average annual growth rate of utilization
during this time period (the coefficient of the linear time trend is 1.79). In Panel B
of Table 2.2, excluding Medicaid beneficiaries who may have different incentives for
responding to the announcement32 produces similar estimates.
When I repeat the above exercise with log prescriptions as the dependent
variable in Columns 4-6, I find a smaller percent decline in utilization after the an-
31Estimating the interrupted time series with only the announcement indicator and time trend
in Column 2 produces a similar estimate of the announcement effect as in Column 3. This implies
that the utilization changes during this time period load more heavily on the announcement than
on the implementation.
32Recall that Medicaid beneficiaries were switched from Medicaid drug coverage to Medicare
coverage either automatically or with the option of choosing a plan. To the extent that Medicaid
beneficiaries were aware of this change, it is not clear whether they would anticipate a decline or
increase in benefit generosity from Part D.
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nouncement. This announcement effect is statistically insignificant when both the
announcement and implementation indicators are included in Column 6. Since the
log transformation places more weight on smaller prescription counts, this difference
in results suggests possible treatment effect heterogeneity, with the announcement
having a larger effect for elderly with high levels of drug utilization. I investigate this
claim further by estimating quantile regressions of the same interrupted time series
model. I estimate block bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals at the person level to
preserve the serial correlation structure of the error term. The estimated conditional
quantile treatment effects and confidence intervals are presented graphically in Fig-
ure 2.6 for each quantile of the conditional distribution of total prescriptions. The
negative announcement effect increases monotonically across quantiles and only be-
comes statistically significant beginning with the 75th quantile and above.33 Then,
in the far upper tail of the distribution, the effect again becomes statistically insignif-
icant due to the large sampling variability in the very highest quantiles. In contrast,
the implementation effect conditional on the announcement indicator is close to
zero and statistically insignficant for every quantile of the distribution. This shows
that, indeed, announcement effects are concentrated among elderly with high drug
use. This result is also consistent with evidence presented later which shows that
the announcement effect is driven by chronic drug use (by definition, chronic drugs
require more prescription purchases).
The results in this section confirm the visual impressions from Figure 2.5 and
33If there are rank reversals, these estimates do not necessarily identify treatment effects for
individuals at each unconditional quantile of the distribution.
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suggest that the rise in utilization during the first year of Part D may largely rep-
resent a recovery from the anticipatory decline with little net increase in utilization
generated by Part D. This causal interpretation will be investigated in detail in the
following sections.
B. Alternative Outcomes and Specifications
In Table 2.3, I investigate whether a similar announcement response can be observed
for alternative outcome measures – number of prescriptions conditional on use, total
expenditures, and out-of-pocket expenditures. Again, I estimate the model in Equa-
tion 2.2. I also estimate a probit model for the probability that an individual pur-
chases any prescriptions during the year. The announcement and implementation
have no effect on the probability of any drug use as the estimates are approximately
zero with small confidence intervals. This is not surprising given the nearly universal
use of drugs among the elderly. However, these results may mask important changes
in the initiation or discontinuation of individual drug products. Given that there
is no utilization effect along the extensive margin, the estimates for prescriptions
conditional on use are very similar to the unconditional estimates.
As would be predicted, the expenditure estimates in Columns 7 through 10
have the opposite pattern of the utilization results. Any decline in expenditures rel-
ative to trend resulting from the anticipatory utilization dip reinforces the predicted
negative implementation effect of Part D on expenditures. Thus, unlike with uti-
lization, failing to include the announcement effect biases the implementation effect
downwards in absolute value. Focusing on log expenditure results, which account
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for the skewness in the expenditure distribution, we can see that including the an-
nouncement effect increases the absolute size of the implementation effect slightly
from -0.010 to -0.014 percent. The announcement effect represents a 0.3 percent
decline which is statistically insignificant.34 Out-of-pocket expenditures are likely
to be more responsive than total expenditures since this is the outcome that is most
directly targeted by Part D. Moreover, individuals who intertemporally substitute
aim to reduce out-of-pocket costs. The announcement effect is much larger in this
case, but is still statistically insignificant. After controlling for the announcement
effect, the implementation effect changes from -12.9 to -15.6 percent.
Finally, in Appendix Table A.2, I estimate alternative specifications that con-
trol more flexibly for time trends. The estimates are mostly robust across specifi-
cations. First, I include a quadratic time trend. The coefficient on the linear term
drops to -0.17 and its standard error increases sharply, suggesting a collinear rela-
tionship with the quadratic term. Given that 6 years of data provides too limited
a range to estimate a quadratic trend precisely, the quadratic term is dropped in
subsequent models. Second, I allow for a slope shift in the linear trend after the
announcement in Column 2. I add the variable “Years Since Announce” to Equa-
tion 2.2, which is defined as the year minus 2003 in the announcement period, so
that it takes on a value of 1 in 2004 and a 2 in 2005, and zero otherwise. Allow-
ing for a slope shift produces an estimate of the announcement effect in 2004 (the
linear combination of the coefficients of Announce + Years Since Announce) that is
34Some of the loss in precision may reflect measurement error for expenditures, which may be
less accurately reported relative to the count of purchases.
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nearly identical to the estimate from only a level shift. Third, I estimate the trend
non-parametrically by including a full set of year dummies. One advantage of this
specification is that a structural break is not imposed in any particular year. Still,
the model identifies a trend break in 2003. The results in the bottom panel com-
paring the one-year change in utilization from 2003 to 2004 relative to the change
from 2002 to 2003 indicate a statistically significant decline of 2.32 prescriptions
after the announcement. Furthermore, there is no statistically significant difference
in the change from 2002 to 2003 relative to the change from 2004 to 2005. This
result provides further support for using a linear specification to approximate the
time trend. In Appendix Table A.3, I also test whether the aggregate results are
robust to estimating a negative binomial model which accounts for the count nature
of the prescription data and its overdispersion. The negative binomial and OLS
results are similar in magnitude and significance.
2.6.2 Treatment Heterogeneity by Age, Education, and Income
Next, I examine how aggregate anticipatory responses vary across age, income,
and education groups. In the above sections, I have focused on the 66-74 age group
which has been shown to experience a sharp decline in drug use after the announce-
ment of Part D. I now expand the sample to include elderly ages 75-85. As noted in
Section 2.4.1, I exclude elderly over age 85 due to the non-comparable measurement
of prescription drug use for this age group. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4 compare
age groups 66-74 (repeated from table 2.2) and 75-85. Only the 66-74 age group
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exhibits an anticipatory utilization response. The older age group has a large pos-
itive contemporaneous implementation effect, but no announcement effect. Thus,
the younger age group appears to be more forward-looking in their drug utilization
response. This is consistent with the fact that the health costs of deferring drug use
is lower for younger individuals who are in better health and also that younger in-
dividuals have a longer time horizon over which to derive benefits from the delayed
treatment. Furthermore, the younger age group is likely to have more cognitive
awareness of the announcement and benefit design of Part D.
I also consider heterogeneous effects for other demographic groups. Since the
announcement effect is only apparent for the 66-74 age group, I look within this age
group for variation in the effect size by income and education levels. Comparing
Columns 5 and 6, we can see that the negative announcement effect for the 66-74
age group is driven almost entirely by elderly with income below the median. This
conforms to expectations, since these individuals are most liquidity constrained and
also anticipate larger benefits from Part D, given the additional subsidies provided
to low income beneficiaries. Finally, after controlling for income, individuals with a
high school degree or less have a larger negative announcement and implementation
effect than those with more than a high school degree. This result is somewhat
surprising since access to information about the announcement might be expected
to increase with higher levels of education. However, this difference might also reflect
unobserved characteristics that are correlated with education, such as health status.
A positive relationship between education and health has been widely documented
in the literature (e.g. Lleras-Muney, 2005; Deaton and Paxson, 2001; Grossman and
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Kaestner 1997). While individuals in poor health may find it more costly to delay
treatments, they are also more frequent users of chronic drugs which, as discussed
in the next section, have a greater scope for intertemporal substitution.
2.6.3 Chronic and Acute Difference-in-Difference Estimates
A. Basic Results
If the observed decline in drug utilization is the result of anticipatory behavior, we
would expect to find differential utilization responses for chronic and acute drugs
purchased by the elderly. In this section, I test this hypothesis for the 66-74 age
group. Figure 2.7 plots sample means of total prescriptions for chronic and acute
drugs in each year and predicted counterfactual trends in the post-announcement
period.35 I find differential trends in drug utilization that follow the pattern pre-
dicted by the life-cycle model. While both drug types exhibit smooth linear trends
before the announcement of Part D, there is a substantial negative trend break
after 2003 for chronic drugs, whereas acute drug utilization continues along its pre-
existing trend. After Part D is implemented, utilization increases relative to the
counterfactual trend for both acute and chronic drugs. This pattern is consistent
with the hypothesis that chronic drug use is more responsive to anticipated future
prices, while both chronic and acute drugs are responsive to contemporaneous prices
at the time of implementation.
35The dashed lines represent pre-announcement period trends projected forward, which can be
obtained by estimating the basic model, Equation 2.1, without controls. To implement this, I first
estimate the coefficients in the basic model from Equation 2.1. Then I recode the announcement
and implementation indicators as zeros for all observations and compute the predicted values for
total prescriptions in each year.
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Table 2.5 formalizes this graphical evidence by reporting the difference-in-
difference regression results from estimating Equation 2.1 for chronic and acute
drugs– that is, I compare the change in utilization for chronic drugs relative to acute
drugs before and after the announcement and implementation of Part D. Columns 1
and 2 present results that use the most conservative method for classifying drugs as
chronic or acute (the median assignment rule), while columns 3 and 4 use the more
stringent 65% classification rule.36 This split by classification rule is tantamount to
comparing utilization trends for drugs in classes that are more likely to be chronic
with drugs that are more likely to be acute versus comparing drugs in a subset of
classes that are much more likely to be chronic with drugs that are much more likely
to be acute. In the latter classification method, drug classes that are nearly equally
likely to be either chronic or acute, are dropped from the sample and the total
count of acute and chronic prescriptions purchased are recalculated for each person.
Consequently, the mean number of chronic and acute prescriptions filled under the
median rule is larger than the mean under the 65% rule (22.14 chronic and 3.26 acute
drugs compared to 17.28 and 1.37). Clearly, there is a trade-off between reducing
classification measurement error through increasingly stringent classifications and
increasing the number of drug classes (and hence total prescriptions) included in
the sample. The 65% classification rule, which includes 73% of the prescriptions in
the original sample, provides a greater balance of these two objectives than other
36Recall that the median rule designates a therapeutic drug class as acute or chronic if more than
50% of the drugs in that class have ≤ 2 purchases per year or > 2 purchases per year, respectively.
The 65% rule does the same, except that it requires that more than 65% of the drugs in the class
fit either criteria. If the therapeutic drug class cannot satisfy either criteria (e.g. 45% of the drugs




Consistent with the patterns depicted in the figure, I find in Table 2.5 a large
decline in chronic drug use relative to acute drug use after the announcement of
Part D using both classification methods. For the median classification method,
the use of chronic drugs declined by 1.72 prescriptions in absolute terms compared
to 0.16 prescriptions for acute drugs relative to pre-announcement trends (bottom
panel of Column 2). This effect is only statistically significant for chronic drugs. The
difference-in-difference estimate of the relative change in utilization for chronic drugs
is -1.57 (a 7% decline relative to the mean for chronic drugs) and is also statistically
significant at the 1% level. The DID estimate is similar for the 65% classification
rule in Column 4, although it represents a slightly larger proportional change given
the lower baseline mean of chronic prescriptions in this sample. To the extent
that changes in acute drug use control for underlying aggregate shocks to health,
insurance coverage, pharmaceutical prices (I consider each of these in turn in Section
2.7.2), and other possible confounding factors, the DID estimate is representative of
the causal announcement effect. While this claim is fundamentally untestable, the
fact that the announcement effect for acute drugs is both qualitatively small and not
significantly different from zero alleviates major concerns of a potential bias from
coincident aggregate shocks. As before, the negative announcement effect for chronic
drugs suggests that Medicare beneficiaries delayed some drug use in anticipation of
subsidized Part D coverage. Meanwhile, acute drug use does not respond to the
announcement of the future price change as predicted.
I next turn to the implementation effects to estimate the treatment effect bias
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from ignoring this anticipatory response. First, I estimate the model in Equation
2.1 assuming that there are no anticipatory effects for chronic and acute drugs by
excluding the announcement indicator and the announcement-by-chronic interac-
tion term. In other words, I assume that θ2 = 0 and θ6 = 0 (recall that the second
assumption was rejected in the section above). In this misspecified model, the imple-
mentation response is positive, large, and statistically significant for chronic drugs,
representing an absolute increase of 4.51 and 3.61 prescriptions for the median and
65% classification rules, respectively. However, when announcement controls are
added in Columns 2 and 4, the implementation effect drops to 2.27 and 1.73 for
the two classification rules. Thus, accounting for the negative announcement effect
reduces the estimated implementation effect for chronic drugs by about one-half,
suggesting a potentially large upward bias in previous studies that evaluate the first
or second year impacts of the program. Meanwhile, there is a large increase in acute
drug use relative to trend after the implementation of 23.6% (.323/1.37). This effect
is stable across the specifications with and without announcement controls, as ex-
pected, given that we could not reject that θ̂2 = 0. In this section I have focused on
the absolute change in utilization relative to trend after the implementation, rather
than the DID estimate, because acute drug use may also be responsive to the im-
plementation of Part D. This implementation estimate is causal if other aggregate
shocks to utilization did not occur in 2006. Nevertheless, given the strong evidence
of a negative anticipatory effect, we can still conclude that ignoring anticipatory
responses leads to biased program effect estimates.
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B. Robustness Tests
Moving beyond the basic results, I consider several alternative specifications as ro-
bustness tests. One concern with the announcement effect estimated in levels is that
there is a large difference in baseline mean utilization between chronic and acute
drugs. The absence of an announcement effect for acute drugs may be simply an
artifact of the more limited scope for downward adjustment for these drugs. Fur-
thermore, given the large difference in the average duration of treatment, it is not
clear that differences in level effects alone can be interpreted as different treatment
impacts. Delaying one acute treatment could lead to a decline in utilization of one
or two prescriptions, whereas delaying a chronic treatment could lead to a decline of
five or more prescriptions. To address this concern, I compare proportional changes
for chronic and acute drugs using log prescriptions as the dependent variable in
Columns 5-8 of Table 2.5. With the log specification, I also find that the announce-
ment effect for acute drugs is statistically insignificant and close to zero, suggesting
that the low mean for acute drugs is not driving the smaller effect size. Moreover,
chronic drug utilization declined by a statistically significant 11.3% relative to acute
drugs under the 65% classification rule. This is slightly larger than the announce-
ment effect estimated in levels. For the median classification rule, the relative decline
of chronic drugs after the announcement is not statistically significant.
The implementation effect for acute drugs in Columns 6 and 8 is large, positive,
and statistically significant which is similar to the results in levels. For chronic drugs,
the results for logs and levels differ. Unlike the level results, the log implementation
effect is not statistically different from zero once controlling for the announcement
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effect. However, given the large standard errors due to using only one year of
post-implementation data,37 I cannot confidently interpret this as evidence of no
program effect. However, the results still suggest a substantial upward bias from
the anticipatory response. Controlling for the announcement effect in column 8,
the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for the implementation effect is
12.8%. This is smaller than the point estimate from estimating the model excluding
announcement controls, suggesting an upward bias. Comparing point estimates
across the specifications with and without announcement controls, the estimated
upward bias for chronic drugs is much larger in logs than in levels (558.2% in logs
compared to 108.7% in levels for the 65% classification rule).
I next conduct additional sensitivity tests of the drug classification method.
As previously noted, one limitation of the empirical classification method is that
some chronic drugs will be classified as acute drugs and vice versa. This could bias
the chronic announcement effect towards zero and the acute effect away from zero.
In Table 2.6, I repeat the analysis of the above section for the 50%, 55%, 60%,
65%, 70%, and 75% classification rules for both level and log prescriptions. Moving
from 50% to 75% reduces classification measurement error, but also lowers the total
number of prescriptions included in the sample by construction. I do not report the
results for the 80% classification rule and above since these rules exclude more than
93% of the original sample of prescriptions, omitting many classes of drugs widely
used by the elderly such as Cardiovascular, Cardiac, and Psychotherapeutic drugs.
The results for the announcement and implementation effects are extremely stable
37To date, 2006 is the most recent year of data available in the MCBS.
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across classification methods. Importantly, the acute announcement effect is close
to zero and statistically insignificant in every single level and log specification. For
chronic drugs, the relative announcement effect is statistically significant in levels
and increases slightly across specifications, though this pattern is non-monotonic.
In the log specification, even though the relative announcement effect for chronic
drugs is statistically insignificant for the median and 55% classification methods,
the effect becomes significant for the more stringent 60% through 70% classification
methods. This is reassuring evidence of a robust proportional effect.
I consider two additional specification tests. First, in Appendix Table A.4, I
relax the linear time trend assumption for the median classification rule. I include
a quadratic trend, allow for slope shifts in addition to the level shift, and estimate a
non-parametric trend. These tests are analogous to those performed for the aggre-
gate model in Section 2.6.1. As might be expected from inspection of Figure 2.7, the
results are highly robust across specifications, lending support to the suitability of
the linear time trend. Second, I estimate a negative binomial model. The marginal
effects are reported in Appendix Table A.5. As with other non-linear models, the
marginal effects are conditional on the independent variables and vary across obser-
vations. Figure 2.9 plots the marginal effects and z-statistics for the interaction of
the announcement and chronic indicators for each person in the sample as a func-
tion of their predicted prescription count. Characteristics that predict higher drug
use are associated with a larger negative chronic announcement effect (within the
chronic and acute observations).38 Computing marginal effects for interaction terms
38Acute and chronic observations have different, non-overlapping ranges of values for predicted
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in non-linear models requires explicit calculation of the cross-partial or (in this case)
“double-difference” of the conditional expectation function, rather than the single-
difference as is appropriate for non-interacted variables (Ai and Norton, 2003). The
main interaction term of interest in this study is the difference between chronic and
acute drugs in the change in utilization before and after the announcement. This
effect is expressed in conditional expectations notation as Ωi in Equation 2.3 below.
Ωi = {E[Yitg|Tig = 1, ANNOUNCEt = 1, Xit]− E[Yitg|Tig = 1, ANNOUNCEt = 0, Xit]}
− {E[Yitg|Tig = 0, ANNOUNCEt = 1, Xit]− E[Yitg|Tig = 0, ANNOUNCEt = 0, Xit]}
(2.3)
I compute the average marginal effect (weighted by population sampling weights)
for the interaction term analytically as follows in Equation 2.4 and apply the Delta
method to estimate standard errors.39 The individual marginal effects and z-statistics










prescriptions. The announcement interaction effect becomes more negative at the high end of each
range. This may partially reflect measurement error of the classification method in the median
classification rule.
39Given that the conditional mean for the negative binomial is exp(X ′β), the actual computation
of Ωi is as follows using estimated coefficients:
Ωi = exp(θ0 + θ1t+ θ2 + θ3IMPLEMENTt + θ4 + θ5t+ θ6 + θ7IMPLEMENTt +X
′
itΓ)
− exp(θ0 + θ1t+ θ3IMPLEMENTt + θ4 + θ5t+ θ7IMPLEMENTt +X ′itΓ)
− exp(θ0 + θ1t+ θ2 + θ3IMPLEMENTt +X ′itΓ)




The average announcement and implementation marginal effects for chronic
and acute drugs are very similar to the OLS results. The change in chronic drug
utilization relative to acute use after the announcement is -1.34 compared to -1.42
in the OLS model and is statistically significant at the 1% level (Appendix Table
A.5). As before, acute drug use does not respond significantly to the announcement.
One final concern is that the negative announcement effect could be driven
by a single class of drugs that experienced a large unknown utilization shock after
2003 (e.g. a major product discontinuation). I estimate the contribution of each
drug class to the main effect reported in Table 2.2 by running the basic model sepa-
rately for each of the 32 therapeutic drug categories in the MCBS.40 In Table 2.8, I
report the coefficients for the announcement and implementation indicators for the
8 classes of chronic and acute drugs with the highest utilization in the MCBS. I
find that the negative announcement effect is not driven by a single drug class, but
is a widespread phenomenon. For example, among the top 8 chronic drug classes,
there are significant negative anticipatory responses for Diuretics, Hypoglycemics,
Psychotherapeutic drugs, and Gastrointestinal preparations. The recovery in uti-
lization after Part D’s implementation varies across classes. For Hypoglycemics (i.e.
diabetes treatments), utilization rebounds fully from the pre-program decline with
an additional net increase. Meanwhile, Psychotherapeutic drugs do not rebound
fully. Some chronic drugs such as Cardiac drugs and Autonomic drugs are not
responsive to the announcement of Part D. These drug classes also do not experi-
40Each regression uses as an outcome the total number of prescriptions purchased in each drug
class, including zeros.
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ence implementation effects. Thus, utilization patterns for these classes may reflect
price-inelasticity to current and future prices, rather than failure of the intertem-
poral substitution hypothesis. In contrast, nearly all acute drug classes, including
Antiinfectives, EENT preparations, and Antihistamines do not respond to the an-
nouncement. Taken together, the results presented in this section provide strong
evidence of the prediction that chronic drugs are more responsive to future prices
than acute drugs.
2.7 Additional Tests of the Anticipatory Effect
2.7.1 Mechanisms
As a further check of the hypothesis of life-cycle behavior, I look for indepen-
dent evidence of the hypothesized mechanisms for an anticipatory response. Doctor
visits are a necessary condition for starting a new therapy. Moreover, new ther-
apies often involve follow-up appointments to check for side-effects and to adjust
treatment regimens. Thus, if the announcement of Part D caused elderly to delay
initiating new treatments, we should observe a decline in doctor visits relative to
the counterfactual trend. I illustrate the trend in doctor visits graphically in Figure
2.10. There is a close correspondence between the trend in utilization and doctors’
visits which is consistent with a decline in new therapies initiated. However, this
evidence does not rule out other shocks that may have affected visits that are coin-
cident with utilization trends. For example, over-time variation in the incidence of
certain illnesses could also lead to coinciding trends.
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I also take advantage of the panel nature of the data to estimate the effect of the
announcement on the probability that treatments are initiated and the probability
that treatments are discontinued. Decreasing initiation probabilities or increasing
discontinuation probabilities are two possible mechanisms for a negative utilization
response. I estimate these probabilities in a similar fashion as the labor supply
transition probabilities estimated by Blundell et al. (2010). For example, using
two-year panels, I can define an indicator which equals 1 if a person uses at least
one drug in class j in period t conditional on not having used any drugs in that
class in period t − 1. Then I can estimate probabilities of initiating a treatment
over time. The probability that a person discontinues a treatment in a given drug
class is defined in the opposite way. In any given year, the probability that a person
begins a treatment in a new drug class is approximately 5%. Discontinuing a class
of treatment is more common with a probability of 25%. Trends of these transition
probabilities are plotted in Figures 2.11 and 2.12. I find a pre-reform decline in the
initiation probability of about 12% followed by a steep increase in 2006. While this
pattern is consistent with elderly delaying new treatments, without access to more
years of data it is difficult to determine whether this represents a break from the
pre-existing trend. In regression results not reported, this change does not represent
a statistically significant decline relative to trend. For tractability, I have estimated
these probabilities at the drug class level, but this masks changes in the initiation
probability of individual drug products. Estimates of discontinuation probabilities
are noisier, making it is difficult to draw conclusions about pre-reform behavior.
However, there appears to be a secular decline in treatment discontinuation over
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the entire time period.
2.7.2 Alternative Explanations
The results presented in the above sections provide strong evidence that the
decline in utilization following the announcement of Part D can be explained by an
anticipatory delay in drug use. Below I examine the potential significance of two
possible alternative supply-side explanations for the decline in drug use after 2003.
One alternative explanation is that pharmaceutical firms, responding to the
anticipated reduced price-sensitivity of the elderly, may have found it optimal to in-
crease drug prices. In order to avoid the potential political backlash from increasing
prices after implementation, firms may have started to raise prices as soon as the
announcement occurred. Thus a decrease in drug utilization could partially reflect a
response to current price rather than anticipatory behavior by the elderly. I test for
this by estimating whether prices increased after the announcement more for drugs
that were differentially used by the Medicare population (which is similar in spirit
to Duggan and Scott Morton, 2010). I estimate the following model:
Yjt = α +
∑
t
µt ∗MMSj + µt + δj + εjt (2.5)
The outcome Yjt is the price of drug j in year t and is computed by dividing
total expenditures over total prescriptions in the MEPS. I include a full set of
year fixed effects, drug fixed effects, and interactions of year fixed effects with the
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Medicare market share (MMS). The MMS is the fraction of prescriptions that are
purchased by Medicare beneficiaries for drug j in the 2002-2003 pooled MEPS. This
regression is estimated at the drug level for the top 200 brand-name drugs in terms
of 2003 sales, which are reported in the Drug Topics magazine. I include only the
154 drugs from this list that are present in each year of the MEPS from 2000-2006.
Observations are weighted by the number of prescriptions filled. If suppliers respond
as hypothesized, drugs that are differentially used by Medicare beneficiaries should
see the greatest price growth. In results reported in Table 2.9, I find evidence of
negative, but statistically insignificant, relative price growth for drugs with higher
Medicare market share immediately after the announcement. Between 2003 and
2005, relative price growth increased by 5%, but is statistically insignificant. The
major break in the relative price trend occurs only after the implementation of Part
D with substantial negative relative price growth that is significant at the 10% level.
The absence of a significant price hike among top drugs suggests that the decline in
utilization did not result from price changes.
I also consider the possibility that insurers or employers discontinued drug cov-
erage or reduced the generosity of coverage following the announcement. Increasing
out-of-pocket costs could then explain a decline in drug use. As was noted earlier,
in the aggregate, there is a pronounced secular trend of decreasing out-of-pocket
drug costs for the elderly throughout the study period. This would suggest that
utilization should have risen, rather than declined in the pre-reform period. On the
other hand, drug coverage fell relative to trend after the announcement. Using a
simple interrupted time series, I find a statistically significant 3.7 percentage point
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decline in drug insurance coverage (Table 2.10). This is driven by declining drug
coverage from Medigap plans and Medicare HMOs, while there was an increase in
drug-coverage from self-purchased plans.
Given the limitations of the data, I cannot distinguish whether this decline
was due to changes in offer rates by insurers and employers or changes in take-up.
Reductions in take-up would be consistent with a demand-side anticipatory utiliza-
tion response. Meanwhile, reductions in offer rates or plan generosity should have
affected both chronic and acute drug use alike, which is inconsistent with the em-
pirical findings. Moreover, it is unclear why these two types of plans would have an
incentive to discontinue coverage or reduce its generosity prior to Part D. The MMA
stipulated that Medigap plans discontinue their prescription drug plans beginning in
2006, while other plans would receive subsidies if they maintained coverage. Many
Medicare HMOs became MA-PDs offering Part D benefits in 2006. Finally, as was
discussed previously, only a small share of Medicare beneficiaries receive drug bene-
fits from Medigap and Medicare HMO plans (9% and 11% respectively in 2002) and
the majority of Medicare HMO plans cover only generic drugs. This suggests that
changes in coverage are unlikely be significant contributors to the observed decline
in drug use.
2.7.3 Anticipatory Effects Before Medicare Eligibility?
Finally, I return to the Medicare age-eligible and age-ineligible split to test
whether the announcement of Part D affected consumption patterns for adults who
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are not yet eligible for Medicare. This also formalizes the results from the elderly
and near-elderly comparison in Section 2.6.1. I use the MEPS to compare utilization
patterns for two groups of age-ineligible adults ages 50-58 and 59-64 with elderly
ages 66-74 who are eligible for Medicare. Figure 2.8 illustrates the results of this
comparison. It appears that utilization declines for the age-eligible and oldest age-
ineligible groups after the announcement, while it increases for the youngest age
group. The regression results in Table 2.11 confirm this observation, however due
to the small sample size of the MEPS there is not enough power to estimate the
effects precisely. Still, it appears that adults ages 59-64 may have experienced a
negative anticipatory response to the announcement relative to the 50-58 age group.
Individuals who were ages 62 to 64 at the end of 2003, could expect to become
eligible for Medicare before or during the first year of Part D, while those ages 59
to 61 would become eligible shortly thereafter. It is possible that the anticipatory
effects could be even stronger for the previously Medicare-ineligible than the cur-
rently eligible. Given the high rate of uninsurance preceding Medicare eligibility
(Card, Dobkin, Maestas, 2008), many individuals could anticipate gaining not only
drug coverage, but also coverage of doctor visits, which are complementary to drug
use. In proportional changes, there was a statistically insignificant 9.8% decline in
utilization after the announcement for the nearly-eligible group ages 59-64 relative
to those ages 50-58. Moreover, there was a decline in use that was twice as large
after the implementation. For individuals who were not yet eligible for Medicare,
the implementation may have acted as a more salient “announcement” than the
passage of the law. Comparing changes in utilization for the elderly with the age
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50-58 group, there was also a negative relative announcement effect. This is sta-
tistically insignificant which is perhaps due to the small sample size of the elderly
in the MEPS. Thus, the results provide suggestive evidence that individuals near-
ing Medicare eligibility also change their drug utilization patterns in anticipation of
future coverage.
2.8 Conclusion
The advance announcement of Part D in late 2003, provides an opportunity
to evaluate the effects of program announcements in addition to providing a test of
life-cycle behavior in the context of drug demand. Economic theory makes ambigu-
ous predictions about the effect of a forecastable future price change on the direction
of the utilization effect. For chronic drugs that treat long term illnesses, the effect
could be either positive or negative. While acute drugs that treat short duration
medical events are unlikely to be affected by future price changes. The results of
this study demonstrate a marked decline in drug use following the announcement
of Part D of approximately 6% (or a decline of nearly 2 prescriptions per year),
favoring a dominating intertemporal substitution effect. The shifting of drug use
can be observed most strongly among elderly who are aged 66-74 and less-educated.
Moreover, almost the entire decline in drug use is concentrated among elderly with
below-median incomes who are the most liquidity constrained and who can antic-
ipate the largest benefits from Part D. In contrast to elderly ages 66-74, I find no
evidence of an aggregate anticipatory response for older age groups. A possible
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explanation for this differential is the greater health costs associated with delaying
drug use and lower cognitive awareness of the Part D announcement for older Medi-
care beneficiaries. Adults who are not yet eligible for Medicare may also respond
to the anticipation of future coverage of both drugs and other complementary med-
ical care such as doctor visits. I find suggestive evidence that Medicare-ineligible
individuals who are closer to age 65 are more likely than those further from the
eligibility cut-off to lower drug utilization in response to the announcement.
Since the negative anticipatory response can be observed across many drug
classes, we can rule out the possibility that the anticipatory effect is driven by
idiosyncratic shocks to a single class. In particular, I find strong evidence of a
relative and absolute decline in total utilization for chronic drug classes compared
to acute drug classes which is consistent with theoretical predictions. Despite, the
lower baseline use of acute drugs, this result is found for proportional changes as well.
The comparison of chronic and acute drugs is advantageous because any plausible
alternative explanation must also explain this differential effect. Moreover, this
comparison is less likely to be contaminated by the endogenous movement from
chronic to acute drugs or by using a comparison group that is partially treated
by the policy announcement. As I have argued, these are challenges that must be
addressed when using other plausible treatment and comparison groups: age-eligible
versus age-ineligible individuals and drug-uninsured versus drug-insured individuals.
I consider two possible supply-side anticipatory responses which could provide
alternative explanations for the utilization decline. First, if the announcement of
Part D caused insurers to eliminate drug insurance coverage, then a decline in use
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could be a response to a contemporaneous increase in out-of-pocket costs. I find,
that there was an approximately 3.7 percentage point decline in insurance coverage
after the announcement driven largely by a decline in drug coverage from Medigap
plans and Medicare HMOs. While it is difficult to distinguish between anticipatory
changes in offer rates and take-up, there is no clear rationale for why we should
observe a decline in offerings by specifically these plans. Moreover, losing insurance
should reduce both chronic and acute drug use, whereas voluntarily opting out of
insurance is not inconsistent with a differential decline in the use of chronic drugs. I
also consider possible anticipatory responses by pharmaceutical firms. Firms could
increase prices in anticipation of the reduced price responsiveness of the elderly,
which could cause a contemporaneous decrease in drug use. I do not find empir-
ical support for the explanation that firms have increased prices. Given the weak
evidence in favor of these alternative explanations, it seems likely that the announce-
ment of Part D caused individuals to lower drug utilization, thus providing support
for forward-looking behavior in drug demand.
If individuals lowered drug use after the announcement in order to defer use
to the period when drugs would be subsidized, why don’t we observe a full recovery
of drug use after the program was implemented? First, given data limitations, only
the first year implementation effect can be estimated using the MCBS. In the first
year, there were many widely-publicized administrative problems (such as clogged
phone lines, website malfunction, etc.) which may have hindered enrollment in the
program. Moreover the penalty-free enrollment deadline was in May, causing many
people to enroll for only the second half of the year. In subsequent years, enrollment
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stabilized and it is possible that the full impact of changes to the timing of drug use
will be more evident when examining long run effects. For this reason, I focus on the
results for the announcement effect, rather than the implementation effect, for which
the estimates are most precise. Also, it is likely that given some confusion about
the benefits of Part D, some elderly who expected to participate in the program and
reacted to the announcement did not ultimately enroll. Furthermore, it is possible
that cost containment strategies employed by prescription drug plans were effective
at reducing utilization growth.
Finally, the observed anticipatory decline in drug use has consequences for
evaluating the program effect of Part D. The impact of Part D on the timing of
drug utilization should be isolated from its impact on generating new drug use.
I have shown that accounting for the negative announcement effect reduces the
estimated total program effect by at least one-half. Thus, failing to account for
anticipatory responses to the announcement in 2003 overstates the impact of Part
D on drug utilization. In a similar way, anticipatory responses may also confound
future evaluations of the 2010 health care reform and should be explicitly estimated.
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Figure 2.1: Part D “Standard Plan” Benefit Design in 2006
Notes: This figure compares out-of-pocket spending for Part D beneficiaries enrolled in
the Standard Plan and for the uninsured. Part D beneficiaries may receive further cost savings
relative to the uninsured due to price negotiations between private plans and drug manufacturers
and pharmacies.
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Figure 2.2: Share of Total Drug Spending Paid Out-of-Pocket by Age Group, 2000-
2006
Figure 2.3: Level of Total Drug Spending Paid Out-of-Pocket by Age Group, 2000-
2006
Notes: Author’s calculation using MEPS 2000-2006. Means are weighted with population
weights and spending levels are adjusted for inflation to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U.
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Figure 2.4: Percent who said they followed news about the Medicare prescription
drug debate ”very closely” or ”somewhat closely”
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation Health Poll Report, 2004
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Figure 2.5: Mean Annual Drug Utilization in MEPS and MCBS
Notes: Author’s calculation using MEPS 1997-2007 and MCBS 2001-2006, non-institutionalized
population ages 66-74, weighted. Includes individuals who appear in the sample for 2 or more con-
secutive years.
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Figure 2.6: Conditional Quantile Announcement and Implementation Effects
Notes: Solid line represents quantile announcement (implementation) effects for every quan-
tile of the distribution of total prescriptions conditional on the implementation (announcement)
and a full set of control variables. Dashed lines represent block bootstrapped 95% confidence inter-
vals (750 replications) and the dotted line is the mean treatment effect. Regressions are weighted
and Medicaid beneficiaries are included. MCBS 2001-2006.
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Figure 2.7: Chronic and Acute Announcement and Implementation Effects
Figure 2.8: Age-Eligible and Age-Ineligible Announcement and Implementation Ef-
fects
Notes: MCBS 2001-2006, weighted. The points represent weighted sample means. The
dashed line shows the preannouncement predicted trends from the model described in Equation
2.1 excluding controls. Chronic and acute categories are defined by the median assignment rule
and correspond to the results in Table 2.5. The age group graph corresponds to the results in
Table 2.11.
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Figure 2.9: Interaction Effects and Z-statistics as a Function of Predicted Total
Prescriptions
Notes: MCBS 2001-2006, weighted; The points represent the estimate of marginal effect of
the interaction between the chronic and announce indicator and the corresponding z-statistic for
each person in the sample ages 66-74.
78
Figure 2.10: Mean Doctor Visits, 2001-2006
Figure 2.11: Probability of initiation (conditional on not filling a drug in the thera-
peutic class in t-1)
Figure 2.12: Probability of discontinuation (conditional on filling a drug in the
therapeutic class in t-1)
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics, 2001-2006
Notes: Means are weighted and pooled for 2001-2006 unless otherwise noted. In columns
5 and 6, unconditional means are shown for outcome variables and the remaining variables show
means conditional on purchasing an acute or chronic drug. Drug classes that could not be classified
as either acute or chronic are excluded in columns 5 and 6.
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Table 2.2: Aggregate Announcement and Implementation Effects
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the person level.
Regressions are weighted and include a full set of control variables. MCBS 2001-2006; Ages 66-74.
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Table 2.3: Aggregate Announcement and Implementation Effects-Alternative Out-
comes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the person level.
Regressions are weighted and include a full set of control variables. Medicaid beneficiaries are
included. MCBS 2001-2006; Ages 66-74.
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Table 2.4: Aggregate Announcement and Implementation Effects-Heterogeneous
Effects
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the person level.
Regressions are weighted and include a full set of control variables. Medicaid beneficiaries are
included. Columns 3-6 are estimated for elderly ages 66-74. Median income is computed separately


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: Announcement and Implementation Effects for Top Chronic and Acute
Therapeutic Classes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the person level.
Columns 1 and 2 are coefficients from 16 regressions of total prescriptions for the drug class on
the announcement and implementation indicators, a linear time trend, and a full set of control
variables. Regressions are weighted and Medicaid beneficiaries are included. The mean number of
prescriptions include zeros. MCBS 2001-2006; Ages 66-74.
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Table 2.9: Announcement and Implementation Effects for Pharmaceutical Prices by
Medicare Market Share
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. This
regression is estimated at the drug-year level from Equation 4. The MMS is the fraction of
prescriptions that are purchased by Medicare beneficiaries for each drug in the 2002-2003 pooled
MEPS. The bottom panel presents linear combinations of the coefficients and their standard errors.
MEPS 2000-2006.
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Table 2.10: Announcement Effects for Drug Insurance Coverage
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the person level.
The regressions are weighted and include a full set of control variables. The coefficients are from
an OLS regression of an indicator for drug insurance (for each type of drug insurance) on the
announcement indicator and a linear time trend. MCBS 2001-2005.
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Table 2.11: Announcement and Implementation Effects for Age-Eligible (Age 66-74)
and Age-Ineligible (Age 50-58 and Age 59-64)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the person level.
Regressions are weighted and include a full set of control variables. Medicaid beneficiaries are in-
cluded. The coefficients are from estimating Equation 1 with the age-eligible and two age-ineligible
groups. Age group main effects and linear trends are included but not reported to conserve space.
The bottom panel presents linear combinations of the coefficients and their standard errors to show




Perverse Reverse Price Competition: Average Wholesale Prices and
Medicaid Pharmaceutical Spending (with Mark Duggan and Judith
Hellerstein)
3.1 Introduction
Generic drugs comprise an increasing share of total prescriptions dispensed in
the U.S., rising from nearly 50 percent in 1999 to 75 percent in 2009 (Berndt and
Aitken, 2010). The generic drug market has typically been viewed as approximately
competitive with price approaching marginal costs. Consequently, the widespread
availability of generic drugs is largely perceived as extremely beneficial to consumers
and, more specifically, to those who bear the burden of paying for these treatments.
However, one important aspect of the generic drug market that has been largely
unexplored is how drug procurement by the government and private insurers impacts
price competition among generic drugs. In particular, procurement rules may distort
generic drug prices away from marginal cost by perversely rewarding higher-priced
generics with greater market share.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate how generic drug manufac-
turers compete in the presence of the procurement rules of the Medicaid program.
We examine the impact of procurement on competition by evaluating how drug pur-
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chasing patterns responded to a plausibly exogenous negative price shock generated
by a significant government intervention. During the period under study, Medicaid
accounted for nearly 20% of all prescription drug expenditures in the U.S. Thus,
distortions in the market for drugs purchased by Medicaid have potentially large
impacts on overall drug spending, and health care spending more generally.
How might procurement distort generic competition? To fix ideas, first con-
sider a stylized market without procurement. In the absence of government and
private insurance, all consumers pay pharmacies in cash for drugs purchased. Con-
sumers are indifferent between bioequivalent generic drugs that are produced by one
manufacturer versus another1, but purchase the drug from the pharmacy with the
lowest price. In turn, pharmacies stock and dispense the version of the generic drug
that is least costly, choosing among possibly dozens of manufacturers. Competition
among generic manufacturers for pharmacy market share drives the equilibrium
price down to marginal cost.
The actual market for generic drugs differs from this textbook scenario for two
main reasons. First, there are very few cash-paying consumers in the pharmaceu-
tical market. The last few decades have seen a dramatic rise in prescription drug
insurance coverage. The fraction of drug spending paid for by public and private
payers has grown from 34% in 1980 to nearly 80% in 2000, and 92% in 2010 (Berndt
and Aitken, 2010). Thus cash-paying consumers currently account for only 8% of
payments. The remainder of consumers are virtually price insensitive, since they
1Since generic drugs are regulated to be identical in their chemical structure and strength, a
specific manufacturer is rarely designated in a physician’s written prescription for a generic drug.
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typically pay a copay that is fixed across equivalent generic drugs. Consequently,
consumers play little role in generic price competition, leaving public and private
payers– who account for the lion’s share of payments to pharmacies- as the main
driving force.
Second, the largest purchasers of generic drugs do not pay pharmacies’ posted
prices. Government and private insurers set their own rules to determine how much
to reimburse pharmacies for drugs dispensed to their beneficiaries. For Medicaid,
like other payers, reimbursement for each prescription is based on a benchmark
price called the average wholesale price (AWP)2, which is published in several pric-
ing catalogues. For each product, this list price is reported to the catalogues by
generic manufacturers themselves, and until recently has been subject to essentially
no independent verification of its resemblance to the actual average price that phar-
macies pay manufacturers to acquire drugs. As a result, generic manufacturers
have had an incentive to compete for pharmacy market share by reporting AWPs
that are much greater than actual average prices, as higher “spreads” lead to larger
pharmacy profits. Put another way, since higher AWPs generate higher reimburse-
ment for pharmacies, manufacturers might report higher and higher AWPs in order
to induce pharmacies to stock their drug rather than a competitor’s drug. This
may partially explain why differences between published and actual average prices
of more than 1000% have been uncovered in recent government audits for some
generic drugs. Thus, competition among manufacturers may increase rather than
2A few states use the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC) or the minimum of the WAC and
AWP as their reimbursement benchmark. In 2000 – the year of the policy intervention we study–
Massachusetts and Rhode Island were the only two states using the WAC as their primary reim-
bursement benchmark (National Pharmaceutical Council, 2000).
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reduce the prices on which Medicaid reimbursement is based, leading to inflated
Medicaid spending.
To empirically investigate the impact of Medicaid procurement on price com-
petition, we examine an intervention that caused a sharp decline in price for a well-
defined set of generic drugs. In the late 1990s, an investigation by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) and the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units
(NAMFCU) “revealed a pattern of misrepresentations by some drug manufacturers
of the average wholesale prices and wholesale acquisition costs of certain of their
products.”3 As a result of this audit, in May 2000, states were advised to reduce the
AWP used to reimburse pharmacies by as much as 95% for approximately 400 generic
and off-patent injectable, infusion, and inhalation drug products. This intervention
provides a useful setting for our study because it differentially targeted drugs within
classes of bioequivalent products, allowing for a comparison of drug purchases before
and after the intervention for DOJ targeted drugs and their competitors. For exam-
ple, in the market for Acetylcysteine, the DOJ recommended that Medicaid lower
the AWP to the audited price for several products produced by three manufactuers,
but did not make any price recommendations for the other seven manufacturers
of this drug. Finding shifts in purchases away from targeted drugs towards their
competitors as the relative price of targeted drugs declined would be evidence that
pharmacies respond to the perverse incentives of the Medicaid program by stocking
products with the highest AWPs.
Using more than a decade of Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data from the
3Office of the Attorney General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, State of New York, 2000.
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Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), we demonstrate that actual
reimbursement per prescription purchased declined substantially for targeted drugs
following the 2000 DOJ recommendations, relative to competitor products whose
AWPs were not targeted by the DOJ. Also after the intervention, we find evidence
of a decline in the number of targeted drug prescriptions dispensed by pharmacies
and an increase in the number of competitor drugs dispensed. Overall, the market
share for targeted drugs fell by about 45% through 2004 relative to the baseline
year. While the findings in this paper are preliminary, they suggest that phar-
macies substituted away from drug products whose prices were reduced. This is
inconsistent with a standard model of price competition in which lower-priced drugs
capture higher market share. Thus, these findings provide preliminary evidence that
Medicaid procurement incentives could lead generic manufacturers to compete by
overstating AWPs and thus reducing the cost savings from these drugs.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides detailed
background about the AWP and related literature. Section 3.3 discusses the inter-
vention. Section 3.4 describes the data and sample restrictions. Section 3.5 outlines





AWP-based reimbursement was first introduced by California’s Medicaid pro-
gram in 1969, at a time when public and private insurers were just beginning to
pay for prescription drugs (insurers accounted for only 15% of drug spending in
that year).4 Its predecessor, “cost-based” reimbursement, reimbursed pharmacies
the exact amount they were charged by manufacturers to purchase the drug plus
a fixed dispensing fee to cover labor and capital costs. This method led to a mul-
titude of reimbursement amounts for identical products. More importantly, since
pharmacies would receive the same (zero) profit from reimbursement regardless of
their acquisition costs, drug manufacturers could in turn set high prices without
reducing pharmacies’ demand for their product.
In contrast, the AWP approach provided an opportunity for pharmacies to
profit from reimbursement through the existence of a “spread.” The spread is the
difference between the reimbursement amount (which is computed as a fixed propor-
tion of each drug’s AWP) and the pharmacy’s actual acquisition costs. A positive
or negative spread is a profit or a loss for the pharmacy. The Medicaid program
anticipated that pharmacies would seek to maximize this spread by searching for
the lowest priced versions of generic drugs. In turn, this would induce price com-
petition among manufacturers, which would thereby allow Medicaid to lower their
reimbursement amounts over time. Other states and private insurers soon adopted
4Calculations from CMS National Health Accounts.
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California’s model and publishers such as the Red Book, Blue Book, Medi-Span,
and First Data Bank, entered the market to meet the demand for data on average
wholesale prices (See Danzon, et al 2005 for a more detailed summary of the history
of the AWP).
A typical AWP-based reimbursement rule used by public and private payers
is defined as follows. For each drug product j dispensed to a recipient of insurance
type i, the pharmacy receives a reimbursement amount equal to5:
Reimbursementij = (1− αi) · AWPj +DispensingFeei (3.1)
Where 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1. Thus a pharmacy earns a profit of Πij = Reimbursementij−paj ,
where paj is the acquisition cost of drug j from the manufacturer.
Given that αi and the dispensing fee are fixed across drugs, the AWPj and
paj are clearly the crucial factors in determining which generic version the pharmacy
will stock. In pricing catalogues, the AWP is reported for each drug at the level
of the National Drug Code (NDC). The NDC is a unique eleven-digit identification
number assigned by the FDA to every drug product distributed in the U.S. The first
5 digits uniquely identify the manufacturer, the next 4 digits identify the product
code (which include the strength, dosage form, and formulation of the drug), and the
final 2 digits identify the package size and type. Thus a single NDC code uniquely
defines one drug produced by one particular manufacturer and is denoted by j in
the equation above.
5This rule generates what is known as the “Estimated Acquisition Cost” (EAC) and reimburse-
ment is based on the minimum of the EAC or “Usual and Customary Charge” (U&C).
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For the Medicaid program, there are a few caveats regarding the parameters
of the reimbursement rule. First, αi may vary by drug type. Reimbursement rules
typically specify two separate αi: one for brand name drugs and another for generic
drugs (the former is typically smaller).6 Second, the AWP is sometimes replaced
by a lower, government-determined price for certain generic drugs. These prices are
known as the Federal Upper Limit (FUL) or the Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC).
FULs, which were first established by the federal government in 1987, denote the
maximum price at which the Medicaid program will reimburse pharmacies for cer-
tain drugs. All generic drugs that have three or more manufacturers are subject to
these limits, which are set at 150 percent of the lowest published AWP among all
equivalent versions of the drug (GAO, 2006). Over 200 drugs are on the FUL list
(OIG, 2001), though reports by the OIG suggest that not all eligible generic drugs
receive FULs (OIG Feb 2004, OIG Dec 2004). MACs are similar reimbursement
limits for generic drugs that are set by each individual state’s Medicaid program.
These limits tend to be wider in scope and are more aggressive than FULs (Abram-
son, 2004). Third, there is also large variation in the αi and the dispensing fee across
states: in the first quarter of 2011, the Medicaid αi ranged from 0.05 and 0.50.
3.2.2 The AWP and Medicaid Procurement Incentives
In the previous section we have outlined the four main parameters govern-
ing transactions between payers, pharmacies, and manufacturers (AWPj, p
a
j , αi,
DispensingFeei). In this section we briefly discuss how manipulation of these pa-
6See State Medicaid reimbursement rules available on CMS website.
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rameters can lead to a perverse form of price competition in which manufacturers
compete to offer pharmacies the highest-priced version of a generic drug. We fo-
cus on the Medicaid program, but an analogous discussion can be applied to other
payers.
First, recall that pharmacies earn a profit from Medicaid reimbursement if it
generates a positive “spread”– that is, the reimbursement (which is proportional
to the AWPj as in Equation 3.1) exceeds the cost that pharmacies pay to acquire
the drug from manufacturers paj . Thus, when choosing among bioequivalent NDCs,
pharmacies prefer to stock the NDC that generates the largest spread. In turn,
manufacturers have an incentive to compete for pharmacy market share by offering
the largest possible spread between AWPj and p
a
j . They can do so by bidding up
the AWPj and bidding down the p
a
j .
While it may have been the original intent of Medicaid’s reimbursement policy
that the AWP reflect some average of the actual prices that pharmacies pay whole-
salers, in practice, manufacturers self-report the AWPj to the pricing catalogues.
These self-reports are not subject to any independent verification (GAO, 2002).
Consequently, as the GAO (2002) explains, the Average Wholesale Price “is neither
an average nor a price that wholesalers charge ... it is a number that manufacturers
derive using their own criteria; there are no requirements or conventions that AWP
reflect the price of any actual sale of drugs by a manufacturer.” Thus, since this
price can be easily manipulated, manufacturers have an incentive to compete for
pharmacy market share by simply reporting higher AWPs.7
7If the AWP reflected some average of the actual prices that pharmacies pay wholesalers, then
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Under the Medicaid procurement rules and AWP self-reports, we would expect
there to be a positive spread (i.e. AWP inflation) in equilibrium. A zero spread
(AWPj = p
a
j ) is not sustainable, since if one manufacturer sets an AWPj such that
AWPj = p
a
j , then another firm can report AWP
′
j > AWPj = p
a
j and capture the
entire market.
Numerous studies conducted by the CBO, GAO, and OIG (e.g. CBO 2004,
OIG 2002, GAO, 2001) have uncovered spreads for brand and generic drugs which
are consistent with the theory above. In one particularly striking study, the OIG
(2002) conducted an audit of approximately 200 randomly selected pharmacies in
eight states to obtain 8,728 invoice prices for prescription drugs. The authors found
that on average pharmacies’ actual drug acquisition price was 83% of the published
AWP for brand name drugs, 56% of the AWP for generic drugs without an FUL,
and 28% of the AWP for drugs with an FUL. Since generic drugs are only subject to
an FUL when there are 3 or more manufacturers, this suggests that the spread can
be largest in the least concentrated drug markets. If pharmacies’ demand responds
positively to the spread, increasing levels of competition among manufacturers could
lead to increases in Medicaid drug spending.
increasing actual wholesale prices requires that the manufacturer trade off the gain from additional
Medicaid purchases against the loss of purchases from other payers. In cases where Medicaid
payments are a small share of sales, manufacturers may find it profit-maximizing to compete by
bidding down the paj rather than bidding up the AWPj .
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3.2.3 Related Literature
While the issue of AWP inflation has received considerable attention in govern-
ment reports and a series of recent lawsuits filed by CMS, it has not been explored in
the empirical health economics literature. The most similar study to the present one
is Duggan and Scott-Morton (2006) which examines the impact of Medicaid procure-
ment on prices for brand name drugs. However, the case for generics differs from the
case for monopolistic brands because Medicaid procurement distorts generic prices
through its impact on competition. A second related literature examines the impact
of Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rules on real (e.g. Gruber et al, 1999) and
nominal (e.g. Dafny, 2005) medical utilization. This literature documents substitu-
tion by providers towards procedures that are more generously reimbursed by public
payers. For example, Gruber (1999), uses variation in the Medicaid reimbursement
differential between Cesarean and normal childbirth across states to show that the
rate of Cesarean births increases in states with larger reimbursement differentials.
Dafny (2005) finds that differentials in Medicare reimbursement by the severity of
diagnosis lead hospitals to falsely recode patients’ diagnoses to the most profitable,
high severity codes. While reimbursement methods that distort actual treatment
decisions could potentially have health consequences, distortions in the choice of
manufacturers for generic drugs will not affect health. In this sense, our study is
more similar to Dafny (2005).
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3.3 Intervention
3.3.1 Details of the DOJ Intervention
This study focuses on a national investigation of AWPs by the DOJ and NAM-
FCU in the late 1990s. The agencies collected actual wholesale pricing data from
wholesalers’ catalogues which “revealed a pattern of misrepresentations by some
drug manufacturers of the average wholesale prices and wholesale acquisition costs
of certain of their products.” The actual wholesale prices were substantially lower
than published AWPs. In an effort “to ensure that Medicaid drug prices are based
on true information,” NAMFCU sent a letter in February 2000 to all state Medicaid
pharmacy directors notifying them of the misrepresentations.8 Beginning on May 1,
2000, First Data Bank (one of the major suppliers of AWP pricing data) provided
states with revised AWPs based on the pricing data uncovered in this investiga-
tion for approximately 400 NDCs representing about 50 drug products.9 States
were strongly encouraged by NAMFCU to use these revised AWPs in place of the
published AWPs in calculating reimbursements for these drugs.
The 400 NDCs represent about 50 unique drugs and had accounted for $306
million of Medicaid spending in 1999.10 These drugs are all generic and off-patent
injectable, infusion, and inhalation products, including about a dozen oncology drugs
8For example, see Office of the Attorney General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, State of New
York, 2000.
9It was also indicated that First Data Bank would update the prices for the 400 NDCs from
data from actual wholesale catalogs every 6 months. Though, some states reported concern that
First Data Bank would not update the prices unless the DOJ and NAMFCU continued to provide
them with wholesale catalogue prices (OIG, 2001).
10This figure is calculated by the authors using Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data for all
states except Arizona. Arizona is the only state that does not participate in the Medicaid Drug
Rebate Program and therefore does not report drug utilization data to CMS.
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and blood clotting factors. The full list of drugs targeted by the DOJ is reported in
Appendix Table B.1. The extent to which the AWP had been inflated for these drugs
is staggering. For the top 20 drugs on this list, published AWPs11 range from 1.1 to
654 times the size of the actual wholesale price (the median is 7.2 times the actual
price). For example, in one case, a manufacturer had reported an AWP of $462.19
for a pack of 25, 6 ml vials of Clindamycin Phosphate, while the investigation found
that the actual wholesale price was $162.00.
While all states received the recommendation to adopt the AWP revisions,
the use of these new prices was voluntary. A survey conducted by the Office of the
Inspector General (2001) found that as of January-March 2001, 30 states had incor-
porated some or all of the revised AWPs into their reimbursements to pharmacies.12
The remaining states continued to be supplied with the original, manufacturer-
reported AWPs from First Data Bank. States that did not adopt the revisions
expressed concern that the new prices were too low, potentially compromising ben-
eficiaries’ access to these drugs (OIG, 2001). It is worth noting that states that
had not adopted the revisions at the time of the survey may have decided to adopt
them later or, in any case, adopted them in a de facto manner when catalogues
stopped publishing the manufacturer-reported AWPs for targeted drugs in later
years.13 Conversely, some early adopter states may have eventually discontinued
11We compare the DOJ-revised AWPs with the AWPs published in the 1999 Red Book.
12The states that adopted the revisions as of 2001 are: AK, CT, DC, DE, FL, HI, ID, IL, IN,
KS, KY, MD, MN, MO, MT, ND, NH, NJ, NM, NV, NY, OK, OR, PA, SC, UT, VT, WA, WI,
WV.
13For instance, the Red Book began to publish revised AWPs for some of the targeted NDCs in
2002.
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the use of the AWP revisions.14
This intervention provides a “quasi-experiment” to study the impact of Med-
icaid procurement on price competition for generic drugs. It generated a large and
sudden reduction in the price on which Medicaid reimbursement is based for a select
set of NDCs within classes of bioequivalent products. Prices for the bioequivalent
competitors of targeted NDCs were not directly affected by the DOJ intervention.
Thus, for the approximately 50 “treated” drug markets, we can examine how the
pharmacy market share for targeted NDCs changed following the reduction in the
relative price of these drugs. We proxy for pharmacy market share using Medicaid
utilization.15
Following the discussion in Section 3.2, we predict that the incentives embed-
ded in Medicaid procurement rules should induce pharmacies to substitute away
from the drugs that experienced the price reduction and towards their competitors’
products, leading to a decline in the market share for targeted drugs. This contrasts
with a standard model of price competition in which the price decline would be pre-
dicted to cause an increase in pharmacy market share. Consequently, if pharmacies
reward higher-priced drugs with greater market share, this provides an incentive for
manufacturers to compete by bidding up the price.
14Finally, even among states that adopted the revisions, not all revised prices for targeted drugs
were implemented. For example, some hemophilia groups claimed that treatment would be dis-
continued if prices were not increased, leading some states to exclude blood clotting factors from
the revisions (OIG, 2001).
15Recall that the consumers should be price insensitive across bioequivalent generics produced by
different manufacturers. Thus shifts from the utilization of one manufacturer’s version to another’s




The main source of data for this paper is the Medicaid State Drug Utilization
Data published by CMS.16 The data series tracks Medicaid spending and utiliza-
tion by NDC for each state and quarter from 1991 through the present.17 NDCs
only appear in the data if they have non-zero Medicaid utilization in the state and
quarter. We aggregate the quarterly data to annual totals. We focus primarily
on two variables: the number of prescriptions and the total reimbursement. From
this we construct reimbursement per prescription which is simply total reimburse-
ment divided by the number of prescriptions. Given that Medicaid reimbursement
is largely determined by the AWP, reimbursement per prescription and AWP should
be strongly correlated. The data set also includes information about NDC charac-
teristics such as the drug name, FDA approval date, whether it is a generic or brand
name drug, and the unit type (e.g. capsule, tablet, milliliter).
We obtain the list of the approximately 400 NDCs that were targeted by the
DOJ from a Program Memorandum issued by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS, 2000).18 This document contains the actual average wholesale price
found in the DOJ audit for each NDC. We use the eleven-digit NDCs reported in
this Memorandum to identify the targeted NDCs in the State Drug Utilization Data.
16State Drug Utilization Data is available from the CMS website:
https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidDrugRebateProgram/SDUD/list.asp
17The quarterly data is highly noisy. This variation may reflect when claims are processed rather
than actual patterns in drug use.
18This memorandum was issued to notify the Medicare program of the alternative source of
average wholesale data that was uncovered by the DOJ and NAMFCU on behalf of Medicaid.
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We find that 379 of the 411 NDCs had non-zero Medicaid utilization, the year before
the intervention.
In this study, we are interested in comparing changes in purchasing patterns
for the targeted NDCs and their competitors whose prices were not revised by the
DOJ. This requires identifying the set of competitor drugs. In choosing which
drugs to stock and dispense, pharmacies may substitute between one generic and
another (or a generic and an off-patent brand name drug)19 if they are bioequivalent.
Thus each NDC competes with all bioequivalent NDCs for pharmacy market share.
NDCs are bioequivalent if all of the following are true: the NDCs share the same
active ingredient name, strength, and therapeutic equivalence rating as reported
in the FDA publication, “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations” (also known as the Orange Book).
As a measure of bioequivalence, we define the market for each targeted drug
as the set of NDCs that share the same active ingredient name. Thus, the analysis
sample includes the approximately 400 NDCs that received revised AWPs and all
other NDCs (generics and off-patent brands) that have the same active ingredient
names as those in the revised group. We use the drug name variable to extract
these NDCs from the State Drug Utilization Data.20 For generic drugs, the drug
name is the same as the active ingredient name. For off-patent brand name drugs
19This sometimes requires permission from the prescribing doctor, but is at at the discretion of
the pharmacy in states with mandatory generic substitution laws.
20This process is aided by linking the utilization data by NDC code to CMS’s Drug Product
File in order to determine the full name of each drug product. In the full US sample, the Drug
Product File can be linked to about 55% of the NDCs in the utilization data. For NDCs that
are not matched with a full drug name, we use the abbreviated drug name that appears in the
utilization data.
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(both active and discontinued), we use the Orange Book to obtain the list of brand
names that have the same active ingredient name as the targeted NDCs. Using this
market definition, there are 379 targeted NDCs and 2,839 competitor NDCs with
positive Medicaid utilization in 1999. While this market definition is conservative in
that it does not exclude any potential competitors of the targeted drugs,21 it almost
certainly overstates the true choice set that pharmacies face when choosing which
versions of generic drugs to stock.
3.4.2 Sample Restrictions
We restrict our analysis to the period from 1994-2004, since changes in the
composition of drugs over time make data further away from the intervention year
less comparable. Our initial sample is constructed at the state-by-NDC-by-year
and includes 795,694 observations. We make three other sample restrictions. First,
we exclude five states from the analysis: Arizona, Alabama, Ohio, Tennessee, and
Texas. Arizona does not report drug utilization data to CMS because it does not
participate in the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program. The other four states do not
use AWP as their primary reimbursement methodology (OIG, 2001). This reduces
the sample by 66,190 observations. Second, we drop NDCs for hemophilia drugs
(Anti-Inhibitor Coagulant Complex, Factor VIII, Factor IX). Hemophilia patient
groups opposed the DOJ recommended prices leading some states to implement
alternative prices for these drugs (OIG, 2001). These three biological drugs are
21Moreover, it allows for the possibility that there can be substitution across different formula-
tions of a drug (e.g. liquid version for tablet) with the permission from the prescribing doctor.
107
unusually expensive relative to the other drugs targeted by the DOJ. They have the
highest mean reimbursement per prescription among drugs in the sample, ranging
from $10,493 to $16,369 in 1999. Winrho SDF, which was next most expensive
drug in the sample, has a mean reimbursement per prescription of $2,080 which is
substantially lower than the cost of the hemophilia drugs. Removing these drugs
from the sample reduces total reimbursement by 15.59% and total prescriptions by
0.04%. Finally we exclude 5 observations that are extreme outliers in reimbursement
per prescription, which are likely reporting errors.22 The final state-by-NDC-by-year
sample includes 723,991 observations. Since the intervention occurred at the NDC
level, we aggregate the data across states to form nationwide totals for each NDC.
There are 32,203 NDC-by-Year observations in the final analysis sample.
3.5 Empirical Evidence of Reverse Price Competition
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Graphical Evidence
In Table 3.1, descriptive statistics are reported separately for NDCs that were
targeted in the DOJ investigation and for their bioequivalent competitors. Means
of variables are presented for units aggregated at the NDC level, except for the drug
group market share variable, which is aggregated at the “drug group” level (the
class of drugs that share the same drug name). The means are shown for 1999 and
the change between 1999 and 2002. Columns 1 and 2 reveal that the DOJ-targeted
22We remove the following outlier observations because they differ substantially from the same
NDCs in other states and years: NDC=00074115170, ME, 1996; NDC=59075065220, WA, 2003;
NDC=39769001101, IL, 1991; NDC=49669162301, AR, 2002; NDC=00026064920, VA, 1999.
108
NDCs were on average about 3 times more expensive than other bioequivalent NDCs.
The targeted NDCs were also Medicaid market leaders with an average market share
that was more than 5 times as large as their competitors’ market shares. However,
since there were fewer targeted NDCs, they made up a smaller share of the overall
market. Targeted drugs were also much more likely to have a liquid formulation
than competitor drugs, which may explain some of the initial price differential.
The data show a decline in both mean Medicaid reimbursement per prescrip-
tion and the number of prescriptions dispensed for targeted NDCs from 1999 to
2002, coinciding with the timing of the DOJ intervention. In the same time period,
reimbursements per prescription and sales increased for competitor NDCs. This
provides suggestive evidence that pharmacies may have shifted away from purchas-
ing targeted drugs following the intervention. We also estimate the probability that
NDCs were discontinued or introduced between 1999 and 2002.23 As a compari-
son, we compute these probabilities between 1995 and 1998. Manufacturers may
have strategically discontinued products that were targeted by the DOJ and then
re-introduced similar products with new NDC codes, which would then be classified
in this analysis as “competitor NDCs”. Targeted NDCs had a substantially higher
discontinuation rate after the DOJ intervention compared with the discontinuation
rate in the pre-period (6.1% versus 0.4%). In contrast, the discontinuation rate for
competitor NDCs did not change substantially over the two time periods, though
it was higher than for targeted NDCs (perhaps due to the fact that these products
23The discontinuation probability is measured as the probability that an NDC has zero sales
in 2002 (and all subsequent years) conditional on having positive sales in 1999. Similarly, the
probability of NDC introduction from 1999-2002 is the probability that an NDC has positive sales
in 2002 conditional on having zero sales in 1999 (and all earlier years).
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had lower market share and there is more churning among smaller products). In-
terestingly, the rate of introduction of new competitor NDCs increased from 39%
between 1995-1998 to 56% between 1999-2002 for manufacturers who had some of
their NDCs in the same drug class targeted by the DOJ (Column 3), while the in-
troduction rate was stable across time for all other competitor NDCs produced by
non-targeted manufacturers (Column 4). This evidence is consistent with strategic
product introduction and discontinuation by manufacturers.
We further examine whether the 1999-2002 change in reimbursement and pre-
scriptions varied across competitor drugs depending on whether or not their man-
ufacturer was targeted by the DOJ for other NDCs within the same drug class.
We might expect that competitor NDCs produced by targeted manufacturers would
respond differently to the intervention for a few reasons. First, because these man-
ufacturers were under increased scrutiny by the DOJ, they may have halted price
growth or even lowered prices on non-targeted products in attempt to avoid further
investigation. Second, targeted manufacturers may have been able to more readily
switch marketing and production efforts between their targeted and non-targeted
products within a drug class, leading to a large increase in non-targeted “competi-
tor” products. However, this effect would be mitigated if pharmacies were reluctant
to purchase non-targeted products from the manufacturers who were under the most
scrutiny.
Columns 3 and 4 report means for competitor NDCs produced by targeted
and non-targeted manufacturers. Competitor NDCs produced by targeted firms are
very similar to targeted NDCs (Column 1) in terms of observable characteristics,
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such as baseline reimbursement per prescription and unit type. Moreover, similar
to targeted NDCs, competitor NDCs of targeted firms saw a small decline in their
average reimbursement following the intervention. In contrast, reimbursement per
prescription increased by 25 percent for competitor NDCs of non-targeted firms.
NDCs from non-targeted firms also experienced substantially larger growth in the
average number of prescriptions purchased relative to competitor NDCs from tar-
geted firms (a 56% versus 0.5% increase). While the means presented in this table
are consistent with the hypothesized effects of the DOJ intervention, the changes in
outcomes from 1999-2002 may also reflect differences in trends across targeted and
competitor NDCs.
Figure 3.1 documents how reimbursement per prescription, prescription pur-
chases, and market share evolved from 1991 through 2004 for targeted and competi-
tor NDCs. Prior to the intervention, mean reimbursement per prescription had been
rising rapidly since 1991 for both sets of drugs. For targeted drugs, reimbursement
per prescription flattened and then declined sharply after the intervention in 2000.
The leveling off before 2000 may reflect an early response to the intervention, given
that the DOJ’s planned policy was outlined to Medicaid State Pharmacy Directors
at a national conference in the summer of 1999.24 The drop in reimbursement per
prescription was not a one-time change, but continued to decline until 2003. This
is consistent with more and more states adopting the revisions or adopting them
more stringently throughout the post-intervention period. In contrast, there was
no corresponding break in the reimbursement trend for the competitor NDCs with
24Office of the Attorney General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, State of New York, 2000.
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average reimbursement continuing to increase through 2004. This is consistent with
there having been a real impact of the DOJ recommendations on actual Medicaid
reimbursement trends– reducing the price of targeted drugs relative to competitors’
prices.
In panel B, trends for the quantity of prescriptions purchased mimic the re-
imbursement trends. For targeted and competitor NDCs there are trend reversals
following the intervention: prescriptions for targeted NDCs declined and increased
for competitor NDCs. Moreover, the overall market share of targeted drugs declined
after the intervention (Panel C). This is strong suggestive evidence of a substitution
effect. For competitor NDCs, the reversal in trend for prescriptions (and targeted
market share) occurred one year prior to the intervention. We examine this further
in Figure 3.2 by separately plotting the trends in prescriptions for competitor NDCs
manufactured by targeted firms and non-targeted firms. The figure shows a notice-
able uptick in prescriptions in 1999 for competitor NDCs manufactured by targeted
firms. At the same time, reimbursement per prescription had evolved smoothly
in the years right before the intervention. One possible explanation for this sud-
den jump in prescriptions purchased is that targeted firms may have anticipated
the intervention and tried to circumvent a loss in market share by shifting sales to
non-targeted products within each drug class. If this uptick represents an anticipa-
tory response by targeted firms, then measuring the change in prescriptions using




A. Reimbursement per Prescription
To estimate the magnitude of the changes in reimbursement per prescription and
prescriptions purchased, we turn to regression analysis. We begin by documenting
the impact of the DOJ intervention on average reimbursement per prescription. If
DOJ prices are incorporated into state reimbursement policies, we would expect
to observe a reduction in the actual Medicaid reimbursement paid per prescription
for the targeted NDCs after May 2000. The differential impact of the intervention
on reimbursement per prescription for targeted NDCs relative to competitor NDCs
is a necessary criteria for using the intervention to identify the impact of price on
pharmacy purchasing decisions.
We first estimate a non-parametric model to test whether there is a structural
break in the targeted NDC trend relative to the competitor NDC trend around the
time of the intervention in 2000:
log(Yjt) = γt + µj +
2004∑
t=1994
βt(Targetj · γt) + εjt (3.2)
The dependent variable is the log of reimbursement per prescription for NDC
j in year t. We estimate proportional changes in reimbursement per prescription
to allow for comparisons across drugs with widely different initial reimbursement
levels. Targetj is an indicator variable which equals one for targeted NDCs and
zero for competitor NDCs. We control for permanent differences across NDCs and
common year effects with NDC µ fixed effects and year γ fixed effects, respectively.
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Standard errors are clustered at the drug group level (again, the group of NDCs
that share the same drug name) to allow for correlation across NDCs within drug
groups and serial correlation over time.
The main coefficients of interest are the full set of interactions of year dum-
mies with the Target indicator. Each βt gives the change in the targeted-competitor
reimbursement difference between year t and the reference year of 1999. These co-
efficients are reported in Column 1 of Table 3.2. Targeted and competitor NDCs
appear to have had the same reimbursement trends before the intervention, as re-
flected in the statistically insignificant coefficients prior to 2000. However, after
states adopted DOJ prices in 2000, there was a very large and statistically signif-
icant relative decline in reimbursement per prescription for targeted drugs. This
differential continued to widen until 2003 and then leveled off. Between 2000 and
2004, reimbursement per prescription fell by 26% for targeted drugs relative to the
4 year change between 1994 and 1998 (exp([β04 − β00]− [β98 − β94])− 1).
Based on the results from the non-parametric specification, we next estimate
a more parsimonious difference-in-difference model which imposes a trend break in
2000. This model allows us to estimate an average intervention effect instead of
making point-by-point comparisons (as above) which may be sensitive to the points
selected. We allow targeted and competitor NDCs to have separate linear trends.
Moreover we allow for both level and slope shifts after 2000, as motivated by the
graphical evidence in Figure 3.1 which showed that the drop in the reimbursement
per prescription was not a one-time change but continued to decline over time. The
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estimating equation is:
log(Yjt) = γt + µj + α1Targetj · Postt
+ α2Targetj · t+ α3Targetj · Postt · (t− 2000) + εjt
(3.3)
Postt is an indicator that equals 1 in 2000-2004 and zero in 1994-1999. t is a
linear time trend and (t− 2000) equals 1 in 2001, 2 in 2002 and so forth. Standard
errors are again clustered at the drug group level. The intercept shift for targeted
NDCs relative to competitor NDCs is measured by α1 and the differential slope
shift by α3. The key identifying assumption is that reimbursement per prescription
for targeted and competitor NDCs would have continued along the same trends
in the absence of the intervention. Combining these coefficients as α1 + 4 ∗ α3
gives the effect of the intervention on targeted NDCs through 2004. The results
from estimating Equation 3.3 are reported in Column 2 of Table 3.2. There is
a statistically significant differential intercept and slope shift for targeted NDCs
after 2000. The intervention appears to have reduced average reimbursement per
prescription by 44% through 2004 (exp(α1 + 4 ∗ α3) − 1). This estimate is larger
than the non-parametric estimate because the point-by-point comparison did not
account for an intercept shift.
In column 3, we examine the robustness of this result to adding linear trends
that vary by drug group δ x Target cells. Given the limited statistical power, we do
not use NDC-specific time trends in this analysis – which would be the most flexible
specification. We continue to constrain the slope and intercept shifts to be the same
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for all targeted NDCs and for all competitor NDCs. This model, which adds flexible
time trends to Equation 3.3, is estimated as follows:
log(Yjt) = γt + µj + Targetj · δg · t+ ω1Targetj · Postt
+ ω2Targetj · Postt · (t− 2000) + εjt
(3.4)
The results are highly robust to the more flexible specification. The results
suggest that reimbursement per prescription declined by 50% from 2000 to 2004
for targeted NDCs relative to competitor NDCs (exp(ω1 + 4 ∗ ω2)− 1). Next, as a
sensitivity test, we exclude competitor NDCs whose manufacturers were targeted by
the DOJ for other NDCs within the same drug class – thus comparing targeted NDCs
with competitor NDCs whose firms were not targeted for other drug products. As
discussed earlier, these competitor NDCs may respond differently to the intervention
given the likelihood that they are under heightened scrutiny and also because they
can shift market share between their targeted drugs and their own non-targeted
bioequivalent products. The results in Column 4 show that the intercept shift and
slope shift are slightly larger after excluding these NDCs. The total effect of the
intervention on reimbursement per prescription through 2004 is 54% for targeted
NDCs, which is only slightly larger than the previous estimate using the full sample.
It should be noted that the results presented in this section are lower bound
estimates of the DOJ’s impact on reimbursement per prescription for two reasons.
First, the estimates represent aggregate effects. Since not every state adopted DOJ
prices or implemented the full set of recommended changes, the aggregate effect
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is smaller than the impact on states that were fully compliant with DOJ recom-
mendations. For example, in Columns 5 and 6, we compare the time pattern of
reimbursement per prescription for the 30 states that reported in an OIG survey
(2001) that they had incorporated some or all of the recommended AWP changes
as of January-March 2001 (Column 5) with all other states (Column 6). During the
first few years after the intervention, the differential decline in reimbursement for
targeted NDCs was much larger for early adopter states. Over time, the decline for
the two groups of states converged, as more states adopted the recommendations.
The second reason why these estimates represent a lower bound is that we
can only observe prices for drug products with positive sales. If the products with
the largest price declines were more likely to be discontinued by manufacturers or
generate zero sales, our estimate would understate the impact of the intervention on
reimbursement per prescription since the largest price reductions are selected out of
the sample.
B. Prescriptions Purchased
Given the substantial differential impact of the DOJ intervention on reimbursement
per prescription for targeted NDCs, we next examine how pharmacy purchasing deci-
sions responded to this plausibly exogenous price shock. There are three main mech-
anisms through which the intervention could have caused changes in the quantity
and composition of generic drugs used by Medicaid beneficiaries. First, pharmacies
may have reduced their purchasing of targeted NDCs (whose relative price declined)
and substituted towards competitor NDCs (whose relative price increased)–thereby
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lowering the pharmacy market share of targeted drugs. Second, pharmacies may
have responded to the profit loss from lower reimbursements by reducing Medicaid
beneficiaries’ access to the drug groups included in the DOJ investigation. This
would cause a decline in the total prescriptions dispensed for these drug groups.
Finally, manufacturers may have strategically discontinued products that were tar-
geted by the DOJ and re-introduced these products (with minor modifications) as
new NDC codes in attempt to undo the effects of the intervention. If this type of
product exit and entry occurred, we would observe a decline in targeted market
share.
In this preliminary analysis, we do not attempt to separately identify the
relative contribution of each of these mechanisms to the change in prescription
quantities. Instead, we use measures that summarize the total intervention effect:
market share of targeted drugs and total prescriptions purchased in the drug group.
In order to capture changes to market share that occur through the introduction or
discontinuation of NDCs, we aggregate the data to drug group-by-year cells. Again
we begin by estimating a non-parametric model to identify trend breaks in the time
series:
MKTSHARETgt = ϕg +
2004∑
t=1994
(βt · γt) + εgt (3.5)
The dependent variable is the market share for targeted drugs, computed as
the number of prescriptions of targeted NDCs in drug group g in year t divided by
the total number of prescriptions in drug group g in year t. Observations with zero
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targeted market share are included. However we exclude any drug group-by-year
observations for years in which there are no sales for both targeted and competitor
NDCs in the drug group. This leaves 480 drug group-by-year observations. We
control for drug group ϕ fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the drug group
level. The market share results could be a misleading indicator of the change in
targeted prescriptions purchased if the total market size is also changing as a result
of the intervention. We verify later in this section that market size did not change
abruptly at the time of the intervention.
Column 1 of Table 3.3 reports the full set of βt coefficients which trace out the
time pattern of market share for targeted drugs from 1994-2004 relative to market
share in 1999. The negative coefficients before and after the reference year reflect
an increasing trend in targeted market share during the pre-period and a decreasing
trend following the intervention. Although the change between 1999 and 2000 is
not statistically significant, the negative coefficients in 1998 and 2000 suggest that
the trend reversal may have begun in 2000 as predicted. The decline in targeted
market share accelerated through 2004. A joint significance test rejects that all
of the negative coefficients following the intervention are equal to zero at the 10%
level. Relative to the 4-year change from 1994 to 1998, the intervention led to a
statistically significant decline in targeted market share of 16.1 percentage points
from 2000 and 2004 ( [(β04 − β00) − (β98 − β94)]=-0.161 with a standard error of
0.058). This suggests that pharmacies substituted towards the competitor products
after the intervention.
Next, we estimate to a linear trend break model which is analogous to Equa-
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tions 3 and 4:
MKTSHARETgt = α0 + α1Postt + α2t+ α3Postt · (t− 2000) + εgt (3.6)
The results in Column 2 of Table 3.3 show that there was a statistically signif-
icant slope change in the trend for targeted market share in 2000 and a statistically
insignificant intercept shift. The market share for targeted drugs fell by 18.4 per-
centage points by 2004 (α1 + 4 ∗ α3), a 45% decline relative to the baseline mean of
40.9% in 1999. This is similar to the effect size found in the non-parametric speci-
fication. In Column 3 of Table 3.3, we add drug group specific linear time trends.
The more flexible specification produces slightly larger effects. Treated market share
declined by 18.8 percentage points by 2004 (a 46% reduction).
In Column 4, we estimate the same model using NDC-by-year level data in
order to facilitate a comparison of the market share change with the price change
at the NDC level (which was presented in Table 3.2). We create a balanced panel
of NDCs by adding observations with zero market share to the sample. This allows
us to capture the effects of NDC entry and exit on market share. We find that
the policy driven price shock reduced the market share of targeted NDCs by on
average 2.1 percentage points through 2004. Relative to the baseline mean of 4.8%,
this amounts to a total reduction in targeted market share of 44%, which is almost
identical to the estimates using drug group level data. Combining this estimate
with our lower bound estimate of the price effect for targeted NDCs from Column
3 of Table 3.2, we compute the indirect least squares estimate of the price elasticity
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of (pharmacy) demand as 0.88 (-0.44/-0.50). The key finding is that this price
elasticity is positive, which is inconsistent with a standard competitive market in
which the lowest-priced drugs capture the highest pharmacy market share.
In Columns 5 and 6, we also compare trends in targeted market share for early
adopter states (as identified by the OIG survey) and all other states. Consistent
with the time patterns for reimbursement per prescription presented in Table 3.2,
targeted market share declined earlier and was greater in magnitude for early adopter
states. In fact, for the states that hadn’t adopted the revisions at the time of the
survey in 2001, market share did not begin to decline until 2003. This mimics the
results for reimbursement per prescription, which showed that reimbursement for
targeted NDCs declined primarily in the later years of the post-intervention period
for the states that hadn’t initially adopted the revisions.
In Columns 7 and 8, we decompose the change in competitor drugs’ market
share by whether or not the NDCs were manufactured by targeted firms. We re-
estimate the most flexible version of equation 3.5 using competitor market shares
for targeted firms or non-targeted firms as the dependent variables. Consistent with
the descriptive statistics and visual evidence discussed earlier, there was a smaller
increase in market share for competitor drugs manufactured by targeted firms (3.0
percentage point increase through 2004 versus 15.9 percentage points). This may
reflect pharmacies reluctance to substitute towards competitor NDCs from the firms
that have a higher chance of being targeted in future DOJ investigations.
Finally, in Column 9 we estimate Equation 3.6 using the log of total prescrip-
tions (i.e. the number of prescriptions for targeted plus competitor NDCs) in drug
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group g in year t as the dependent variable. This provides a preliminary test of
whether the intervention reduced Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to DOJ-targeted
drug groups. The results show that the slope and intercept shifts in 2000 were
small and statistically insignificant. Thus it appears that the quantity of total pre-
scriptions dispensed to Medicaid beneficiaries continued along its pre-intervention
trend. This provides suggestive evidence that pharmacies did not respond to the
policy driven price shock by reducing access to drugs for Medicaid beneficiaries.
The finding that market size did not change following the intervention also makes
interpreting the market share results as changes in prescriptions purchased more
straightforward, as noted above.
3.6 Conclusion
The DOJ recommendations to reduce the AWP for approximately 400 drug
products provides an opportunity to study the impact of Medicaid procurement
on generic drug price competition. Current procurement rules provide perverse
incentives for pharmacies to purchase and stock the highest-priced generic drugs.
Consequently, manufacturers of generic drugs may compete for pharmacy market
share by perversely bidding up the price on which Medicaid reimbursement is based.
We find that Medicaid reimbursement per prescription declined substantially
for targeted drugs following the DOJ intervention. In response to this negative
price shock, pharmacies reduced their demand for targeted drugs and increased
their demand for competitor drugs. Overall, the market share for targeted drugs
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fell by about 45% through 2004. Thus, pharmacies appear to have substituted away
from the drugs that experienced a price reduction towards those drugs whose prices
were unaffected by the intervention. This demand response is inconsistent with a
typical competitive market in which the lowest-priced drugs capture the highest
market share.
In future work, we will extend this analysis in several ways. First, we will ex-
ploit heterogeneity in exposure to the intervention across states by collecting more
detailed information about when each state adopted the DOJ revisions and the
duration of their implementation. Second, we will estimate heterogenous effects
across drug groups, with respect to their Medicaid market share, size, and other
characteristics. Third, we will more directly estimate the price elasticity for phar-
macy demand. Finally we will study how the intervention may have led to strategic
product discontinuations and introductions by targeted manufacturers.
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Figure 3.1: Trends in Reimbursement per Prescription and Prescriptions Purchased,
1991-2004
Notes: Figure 3.1 plots raw means of reimbursement per prescription and number of prescrip-
tions using NDC-level data and mean targeted market share using drug group level data. Means
for NDCs that were targeted by the DOJ and their competitor NDCs are plotted separately. The
sample excludes data from the five states that do not use the AWP as their primary reimbursement
methodology, hemophilia drugs, and outliers as described in the text in section 3.4.2.
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Figure 3.2: Trends in Prescriptions for Competitor NDCs, Targeted Firms vs. Non
Targeted Firms
Notes: Figure 3.2 plots raw means of number of prescriptions using NDC-level data for
“competitor” NDCs. Means are plotted separately for competitor NDCs that were manufactured
by firms whose other products in the drug class had been targeted by the DOJ with competitor
NDCs that were manufactured by firms whose products were not at all targeted in the drug
class. The sample excludes data from the five states that do not use the AWP as their primary
reimbursement methodology, hemophilia drugs, and outliers as described in the text in section
3.4.2.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics, 1999-2002
Notes: Variable means are reported using NDC-level data with the exception of drug group
market share*, which uses drug group-level data. The probability of NDC discontinuation from
1999-2002 is the probability that an NDC has zero sales in 2002 (and all subsequent years) con-
ditional on having positive sales in 1999. Similarly, the probability of NDC introduction from
1999-2002 is the probability that an NDC has positive sales in 2002 conditional on having zero
sales in 1999 (and all earlier years). The sample excludes data from the five states that do not
use the AWP as their primary reimbursement methodology, hemophilia drugs, and outliers as
described in the text in section 3.4.2.
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Table 3.2: Effects of DOJ Intervention on Reimbursement per Prescription, 1994-
2004
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug group level.
Column 1 reports results from estimating equation 3.2 using NDC-level data and Columns 2-4
report results from estimating equation 3.3 and 3.4. Column 2 also includes a linear time trend
interacted with Target which is not reported. Column 3 adds Drug Group x Target specific linear
trends, and Column 4 excludes observations from “competitor” NDCs manufactured by targeted
firms. Column 5 reports estimates from equation 3.2 using data from states that were early adopters
and Column 6 reports estimates for all other states. The F-test tests the joint significance of
Target*Year2000 through Target*Year2004 (p-value in brackets). Sample restrictions are described
in section 3.4.2.
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Table 3.3: Effects of DOJ Intervention on Prescriptions Purchased, 1994-2004
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug group level.
Column 1 reports results from estimating equation 3.5 using drug group-level data and Columns
2-4 and 7-9 report results from estimating equation 3.6. Column 2 is estimated at the drug group
level and includes a linear time trend whose coefficient is not reported. Column 3 adds drug group
specific linear trends. Column 4 reports results from estimating equation 3.6 at the NDC-level for
a balanced panel of NDCs (i.e. observations with zero market share are included). Using NDC
FE instead of drug group FE produces identical coefficients. Columns 5 and 6 report results from
equation 3.5 using the subset of states that were early adopters and all other states. Columns 7
and 8 report results using the market share of competitor drugs (for targeted firms or non-targeted
firms) as the dependent variable. Column 9 reports results for the outcome of total prescriptions at
the drug group level. The F-test tests the joint significance of Year2000 through Year2004 (p-value
in brackets). Sample restrictions are described in section 3.4.2.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
Figure A.1: Illustration of how Drugs are Classified into Chronic or Acute Categories
Notes: In the first step, I generate empirical distributions of the number of prescriptions
filled in a year for drugs in each therapeutic class. These distributions are generated by counting
the number of purchases of each drug for each person/year in the pre-announcement period. For
example, person ID number 1 would contribute a 1 and a 2 to the distribution of fills for the
Antiinfectives class and a 5 to the Cardiovascular class. In the second step, I assign a chronic or
acute designation to each therapeutic class by using the rules listed in the above table applied to
the empirical distribution of each class. Finally, I assign this classification to all drugs in the class
for all years of the survey.
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Table A.1: Classification of Therapeutic Categories
Notes: All figures are from the pooled MCBS 2002-2003 for elderly ages 65+. * This classi-
fication of chronic and acute drugs is for the median classification rule.
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Table A.2: Aggregate Announcement and Implementation Effects-Alternative Spec-
ifications
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the person level.
Regressions are weighted and include a full set of control variables. Medicaid beneficiaries are
included. The bottom panel presents linear combinations of the coefficients and their standard
errors. * The variable “Years Since Announce” is defined as the year minus 2003 in the announce-
ment period, so that it takes on a value of 1 in 2004 and a 2 in 2005, and zero otherwise. The
linear combination of the coefficients of Announce + Years Since Announce provides the estimate
of the announcement effect in 2004. MCBS 2001-2006; Ages 66-74; N=20,072.
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Table A.3: Aggregate Announcement and Implementation Effects-Negative Bino-
mial (Marginal Effects)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the person level.
Regressions are weighted and include a full set of control variables. Medicaid beneficiaries are
included. Columns 4-6 are identical to Table 2.2. MCBS 2001-2006; Ages 66-74.
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Table A.4: Chronic and Acute Aggregate Announcement and Implementation
Effects-Alternative Specifications
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the person level.
Regressions are weighted and include a full set of control variables. Medicaid beneficiaries are
included. Year fixed effects are included in columns 4 and 8. The bottom panel presents linear
combinations of the coefficients and their standard errors. * The variable “Years Since Announce”
is defined as the year minus 2003 in the announcement period, so that it takes on a value of 1 in
2004 and a 2 in 2005, and zero otherwise. MCBS 2001-2006; Ages 66-74; N=40,144.
133
Table A.5: Chronic and Acute Aggregate Announcement and Implementation
Effects-Negative Binomial (Marginal Effects)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the person level.
Regressions are weighted and include a full set of control variables. Medicaid beneficiaries are
included. The classification method used is the median assignment rule (more than 50% of drugs
in the therapeutic class are either chronic or acute). Marginal effects for interaction terms in
the negative binomial model are computed as the double difference as described in Section 6.3.
Columns 3 and 4 are identical to Table 2.5. MCBS 2001-2006; Ages 66-74.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics for Generic Drug Groups Targeted by the DOJ,
1999
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Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics for Generic Drug Groups Targeted by the DOJ,
1999 (Cont’d)
Notes: The sample excludes data from the five states that do not use the AWP as their
primary reimbursement methodology and outliers as described in the text in section 3.4.2.
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